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I. ORIGIN OF THE COURT
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court or the Inter-
American Court) was created by the entry into force of the treaty known as
the American Convention on Human Rights (Convention).' The Court was
born as the Americas' community effort to restore justice in a continent
plagued by conflict and injustice.2 In the 1960's, dictators, torture, and
forced disappearances beset Central and South America.3 The Convention,
also known as the Pact of San Jose for the Costa Rican city where it was
signed, was the response of the Americas to such tumultuous times.4
The American Convention on Human Rights was adopted in 1969
at an inter-governmental conference in San Jose, Costa Rica.5 The
* The author obtained his Juris Doctor degree from Nova, Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in June, 1999.
1. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 9,
OAS/Ser.L/V/HI. 39 (Jan. 21, 1998) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. For a detailed legislative history
of the American Convention on Human Rights, see Conferencia Especilizada Interamericana Sobre
Derechos Humanos, San Jose, Costa Rica, 7-22 de noviembre 1969, Actas y Documentos, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser. K/XVI/I1.2 (1973).
2. David Padilla, A House for Justice in Costa Rica, MAGAZINE AMERICAS, Jan. 1996, at
56.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1. at 9.
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Convention was arranged by the Organization of American States (OAS)."
At this convention, OAS expanded the role of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission or the
Commission) and created the Inter-American Court.7 Both the Inter-
American Commission and the Court were charged with the task of
protecting the rights delineated in the Convention.8 The Inter-American
Commission was structured as an original forum for individuals asserting
to be victims of human rights violations, with the alternative of sending
unresolved cases to the Inter-American Court.'
Although the Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica was adopted in 1969, it
did not enter into force until 1978 when it received its eleventh
ratification'0 attributable to a hemispheric full-court press led by President
Jimmy Carter." The Inter-American Court itself was formally established
in 1979 when the Statute of the Court was adopted by resolution of the
General Assembly of the OAS.' 2 At the same time that the Court was
established, the seat of the Court was fixed in San Jose, the capital city of
Costa Rica, in Central America."3
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT
The norms governing the Court's functions are the Convention
itself,' 4 the Statute of the Court (Statute)," and the Rules of Procedure
(Rules).' 6 The General Assembly of the OAS adopted the Statute of the
6. Thomas Buergenthal, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY
ISSUES 439 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984).
7. Lynda E. Frost, The Evolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections
of Present and Past Judges, 14 HuM. RTS. Q., 171, 172 (1994).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 ILM 673, OEA/Ser.
K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65 rev. 1, cor. 1, (1970). [hereinafter The Convention].
11. Padilla, supra note 2, at 56. Ironically, The United States has not yet ratified the
Convention.
12. Scott Davidson, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1992).
13. Id.
14. The Convention, supra note 10, arts. 52-73
15. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 27, OEA/Ser. L/V/11.50, Doc. 6 (1980), reprinted
in 19 ILM 635 (1980) [hereinafter The Statute]. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 232 (1982).
16. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RULES OF PROCEDURE, OEA/Ser.
L/V/II.3 doc. 13, Corr. 1 (1981). reprinted in 20 ILM 1289 (1980) [hereinafter The Rules].
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Court immediately after the Inter-American Court was established.' 7 A year
later, in 1980, the Inter-American Court drafted and adopted its Rules of
Procedure. 8 The hierarchy of these instruments governing the Court's
functions places the Convention first, followed by the Statute of the Court,
and finally, the Rules of Procedure.' 9
In accordance with the Statute, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights is an autonomous judicial institution which has as its purpose the
application and interpretation of the Convention. 2° To warrant the
appropriate functioning of the Court, the Statute and the Rules provide for
the appointment of judges, a President, Vice-President, Permanent
Commission, and a Secretariat.2'
A. The Judges
The judges meet in two regular sessions each year, on the dates
established by the Court at the previous session.' However, special
sessions may be convoked by the President on his own initiative, or at the
request of a majority of the Court's judges.3 The Court consists of seven
judges,' all nationals of the Member States of the OAS, who are
nominated and elected by the states parties to the Convention.25 A
nominating state may nominate a judge from another state as long as the
nominee is a national of another OAS Member State.' Two judges from
the same state cannot be elected to serve during the same term.27 The
judges are elected "[firom among jurists of the highest moral authority and
of recognized competence in the field of human rights."' The judges must
17. Frost, supra note 7, at 172.
18. Id.
19. Buergenthal, supra note 15, at 232.
20. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
21. Davidson, supra note 12, at 41.
22. Rules, supra note 16, art. 11.
23. Id. art. 12.
24. Presently, the judges at the Court are: Hernfm Salgado Pesantes (Ecuador); Ant6nio
A. Cangado Trindade (Brazil); Miximo Pacheco G6mez (Chile); Oliver Jackman (Barbados);
Alirio Abreu Burelli (Venezuela); Sergio Garcfa Ranfrez (Mexico), and Carlos Vicente de Roux
Rengifo (Colombia).
25. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. Article 8 of the Statute provides that the Secretary
General of the OAS shall request the State Parties to the Convention to submit a list of their candidates
for the position of judge of the Court. In accordance with article 53(2) of the Convention, each State
Party may propose up to three candidates.
26. Convention, supra note 10, arts. 52(1) and 53(2).
27. Id. art. 52(2).
28. Id. art. 52.
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also possess the qualifications to exercise the highest judicial functions in
their own states.29
The States Parties to the Convention elect the judges for a term of
six years through a secret ballot election. 3" Shortly before the expiration of
the outgoing judges' terms, new judges are elected by absolute majority
vote in the OAS General Assembly. 3' Vacancies caused by death,
-disability, resignation, or dismissal shall be filled at the following session
of the OAS General Assembly.32 A judge, whose term has expired, shall
continue to serve with regard to those cases which he or she has begun to
hear and which are still pending.33 Judges elected in this manner are
referred to as "elected judges" or as "titular judges"' to distinguish them
from two other types of judges who may sit in the Court. The other judges
who may sit on the bench from time to time are "ad hoc judges" and
"interim judges. "3
The Convention provides the circumstances in which an ad hoc
judge may be appointed.36 If a titular judge is a national of a state party to a
case, he or she retains the right to hear that case. 7 Any other State party to
the case may appoint a person to serve on the Court as an ad hoc judge.38
Moreover, if among the judges called to hear a case, none is a national of
the state parties to the case, each state may appoint an ad hoc judge 9.3 The
appointment of interim judges is envisaged by the Statute when it is
necessary to maintain the quorum of five judges4' or when a judge is
disqualified from hearing a case.4'
The Court's judges take precedence after the President and Vice-
President 2 according to their seniority in office.43 Judges who have the
29. Id. art. 52(1).
30. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1. at 9.
31. Id.
32. Statute, supra note 15, art. 6(1)(2).
33. Convention, supra note 10, art. 54(3).
34. Rules, supra note 16, art. 2(q)
35. Davidson, supra note 12, at 33.
36. Convention, supra note 10, art. 52.
37. Convention, supra note 10, art. 55(1); The Statute, supra note 15, art. 10(1).
38. Convention, art. 55(2); The Statute, art. 10(2).
39. Convention, art. 55(3); The Statute, art. 10(3).
40. Statute, supra note 15, art. 6(3). Interim judges serve until they are replaced by elected
judges.
41. Id. art. 19(4). Where one or more judges are disqualified from hearing a case, the
President may request the states parties in a meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS to appoint
interim judges to replace them.
42. See text infra section B, President of the Court.
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same seniority in office shall take precedence according to age." Ad hoc
and interim judges take precedence after the elected judges, according to
age. 45 However, ad hoc or interim judges, whom have previously served as
elected judges, have precedence over any other ad hoc or interim judges.'
The decisions of the Inter-American Court are taken by a majority
of the judges as long as the Court is in quorum.47 Judges may only vote
affirmatively or negatively on any given issue since abstentions are not
permitted.48 The President presents, point by point, the matters to be voted
upon.49 Voting takes place in an inverse order of precedence.' In the event
of a tie, the President casts a second deciding vote.5'
B. The President and Vice-President of the Court
The Inter-American Court elects the President5 2 and Vice-President5
3
of the Court from its members by an Absolute majority of votes.' The
President and Vice-President are elected for a two-year term 5 and may be
reelected.56 The President has the obligation to "direct the work of the
Court, represent it, regulate the disposition of matters brought before the
Court, and preside over its sessions."" The President is also the link in
communications between the Inter-American Court and the Permanent
Council or Secretary General of the OAS."8 The President is required to
43. Statute, supra note 15, art. 13(1).
44. Id. art. 13(2).
45. Id. art. 13(3).
46. Id.
47. Davidson, supra note 12, at 47. Quorum is a majority of the entire body.
48. Rules, supra note 16, art. 15(1).
49. Id.
50. Id. art. 15(2).
51. Id. art. 15(4).
52. The Court's current President is Hernin Salgado Pesantes (Ecuador).
53. The Court's current Vice-President is Ant6nio A. Canpado Trindade (Brazil).
54. Statute, supra note 15, art. 12(1).
55. Rules, supra note 16, art. 3(1). The terms begin on July 1st of the corresponding year.
56. Id. art. 3(2).
57. Statute, supra note 15, art. 12.
58. Davidson, supra note 12, at 41.
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serve on a full-time basis.59 The main task of the Vice-President is to
exercise the duties of the President when this is absent.6°
C. The Permanent Commission
The Court's President, Vice-President, and a third judge named by the
President form the Permanent Commission.6 This body's function is to
assist and advise the President in the execution of its duties.6 The
Permanent Commission is governed by the Rules of the Court.6 The Court
has also the discretion to appoint ad hoc commissions to deal with special
matters, and the President may appoint commissions proprio motu to deal
with urgent cases." As a matter of practice, the President has always
favored to ensure that at least one member of the Permanent Commission
resides in Costa Rica, and that he or she has knowledge of the working
languages of the Court.6
D. The Secretariat
In order to carry out the Inter-American Court's administrative
functions, the Court is authorized to establish a Secretariat.6 The head of
the Secretariat is the Secretary, 7 who is also appointed by the Court.' The
Secretary is a full-time officer who possesses, along with a command of the
working languages of the Court, the legal knowledge and experience
necessary to carry out his functions.' The Court elects the Secretary for a
renewable five-year term,'0 but the Secretary may be removed at any time
by the vote of no less than four judges by way of secret ballot. 7' Thus, the
59. Statute, supra note 15, art. 16(2). However, Burgenthal notes, this provision has not been
interpreted to require the President to reside in San Jose nor to require him to desist from other
compatible remunerated activities. See Burgenthal, supra note 23, at 233.
60. Statute, supra note 15, art. 12(3); Rules, supra note 16, art. 5(1).
61. Rules, supra note 16, art. 6(1).
62. Id.
63. Id. art. 6(3).
64. Id. art. 6(2).
65. Davidson, supra note 12, at 44.
66. Convention, supra note 10, art. 59.
67. The Court's current Secretary is Manuel Ventura Robles.
68. Convention, supra note 10, art. 58(2).
69. Rules, supra note 16, art. 7(1).
70. Id. art. 7(2).
71. Id.
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Inter-American Court "[h]as the power to ensure that its chief
administrative officer does not have divided loyalties."'
To assist the Secretary, the position of Assistant Secretary was
created. 73 The Assistant Secretary's function is to assist the Secretary and
deputize for him in his absence.74 The Assistant Secretary75 is appointed by
the Secretary in consultation with the Secretary General of the OAS. 76 If
the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary are temporarily absent, the
President of the Court may appoint an Acting Secretary in their stead."
The Secretariat's other staff members are appointed by the Secretary
General of the OAS in consultation with the Secretary.7' However, in
practice, the Secretary General of the OAS always makes the appointments
recommended by the Secretary of the Court. 79
III. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Convention set forth the jurisdictions of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights. The Convention confers contentious'u (also called
adjudicatory jurisdiction) and advisory functions on the Inter-American
Court."' Both jurisdictions have formal and informal effects on the region's
human rights situation.' Formally, the Court's contentious decisions,
advisory opinions, and provisional measures protect human rights and
develop legal principles of international human rights law. 3 Informally, the
Court's involvement in a case has brought positive action within the state
involved.'s
72. Buergenthal, supra note 15, at 234.
73. Statute, supra note 15, art. 14(3).
74. Rules, supra note 16, art. 8(1); Statute, supra note 15, art. 14(4).
75. Renzo Pomi is the current Deputy Secretary.
76. Rules, supra note 16, art. 8(1); The Statute, supra note 15, art. 14(4).
77. Rules, supra note 16, art. 8(2).
78. Statute, supra note 15, art. 14(4).
79. Buergenthal, supra note 15, at 234.
80. Convention, supra note 10, art. 62.
81. Id. art. 64.
82. Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing Precedents
and Procedure in Human Rights Law, U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 297, 348 (1994-1995).
83. Id. Governments called before the Court have attended the public hearings and argued
their cases. Governments ordered by the Court to pay full reparations have committed to do so. See
e.g. Velisquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Compensatory Damages), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 7
(1988).
84. Id. at 351. When the Commission sought the opinion of the Court regarding the execution
of defendants in Guatemala, the government of Guatemala attended the public hearing on the matter
even though it did not consent to the Court's jurisdiction. At the hearing Guatemala announced the
1999]
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A. The Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court
The contentious function involves the jurisdiction to adjudicate
disputes relating to charges that a state party has violated the Convention.'
The Court's contentious jurisdiction enables it to adjudicate actual
controversies between two or more parties. 6 The Inter-American Court's
judgment in a case is binding on the partiesY In a contentious case the
Court may award compensatory damages."8
Only the State Parties and the Inter-American Commission have the
right to submit a case to the Court. 9 Any person, group or private entity
legally recognized in a Member State may present petitions with the
Commission.' The Convention set forth the procedure for the Court to
hear a case from the Commission.9' In cases of extreme gravity, the Court
may adopt provisional measures in matters it has under consideration or are
being processed by the Commission.' A State Party is not deemed to have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court simply by ratifying the Convention.'
Acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction by a state is optional,' and requires
a separate declaration or agreement." The State Parties may accept the
suspension of the executions. Charles Moyer & David Padilla, Executions in Guatemala as Decreed by
the Courts of Special Jurisdiction in 1982-83: A Case Study, 6 HuM. RTs. Q., 507, 516, 520 (1984).
85. Convention, supra note 10, art. 62.
86. Mary Caroline Parker, Other Treaties: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Defines its Advisory Jurisdiction, 33 AM. U. L. REV., 211, 215 (1983).
87. Id. (citing article 62(1) of the Convention).
88. Frost, supra note 7, at 174; (citing Article 63(1) of the Convention). Examples of the
Inter-American Court ordering compensatory damages are the Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Reparations),
Judgment of November 27, 1998, par. 4, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 42 (Peruvian Government
ordered to pay US$ 99,190.30 to Maria Loayza Tamayo); and Castillo Paiz v. Peru (Reparations),
Judgment of November 27, 1998, parn. 1; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43 (Peruvian Government
ordered to pay US$ 245,021.80 to the family of Ernesto Rafael Castillo Pa6z.)
89. Convention, supra note 10, art. 61(1).
90. Id. art. 44.
91. Article 61(2) of the Convention indicates that articles 48 through 50 set forth the
procedures the Commission must complete before the Inter-American Court may hear a case.
92. Convention., supra note 10, art. 63(2).
93. Buergenthal, supra note 15, at 236.
94. Id. (citing article 62(1) of the Convention).
95. Id. As of this writing the following State Parties have recognized the Court's contentious
jurisdiction: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad &
Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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Court's jurisdiction at any time,9 "[ulnconditionally, on condition of
reciprocity, for a specific period, or for specific cases."97
B. The Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court
The Court's advisory function involves the power of the Member
States listed in the Charter of the OAS, to request that the Court interpret
the Convention or other human rights treaties.9" The advisory jurisdiction
extends to all OAS Member States, even those which have not ratified the
Convention." The treaty in question does not have to be one adopted
within the Inter-American system or a treaty to which only American states
may be parties."° The Court may interpret any treaty that concerns the
protection of human rights in a Member State of the Inter-American
system.' 01 Direct access to the Court's advisory jurisdiction is extended to
all OAS organs, not just the Commission. 2
The advisory jurisdiction of the Court enables it to hear cases that are
inaccessible to the Court under the contentious jurisdiction. Parties that
otherwise are not eligible to present cases to the Court, may request the
Court's advisory opinion.1°3 Also, the procedures required for contentious
jurisdiction do not apply for advisory jurisdiction."° Moreover, compliance
with the Court's ruling does not single out a state as violator of human
rights so it is more politically acceptable."'
96. Convention, supra note 10, art. 62(1).
97. Id. art. 62(2).
98. Id. art. 64.
99. Thomas Buergendal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court,
79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1. 3 (1985).
100. Id. at 5.
101. Parker, supra note 86, at 227.
102. Manuel D. Vargas, Individual Access to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 16
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL., 601, 612 (1984).
103. Parker, supra note 86, at 219.
104. Id. at 246, n. 40.
105. Parker, supra note 86, at 219.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Prohibitions against torture and other forms of ill-treatment are well-
recognized as basic human rights in international law. However, despite
their basic nature, they are by no means simple for the judicial bodies
called upon to establish their existence and to condemn the States that
commit them.'
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has interpreted the
personal integrity provisions of Article 5 of the American Convention on
Human Rights in several cases, and has touched on many of the important
issues with regard to respecting human dignity, torture and cruel, inhuman,
* The author graduated cum laude from Harvard Law School in 1997. During 1998,
she was a staff attorney for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in San Jos6, Costa Rica.
Currently, she is the Program Officer for the Due Process of Law Foundation, an organization
which promotes human rights through reform of justice systems and training of judicial personnel
throughout the Americas.
1. "However basic this human right may seem, it is most complex indeed." Clovis C.
Morrisson, DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION
SYSTEM 72 (1981); "Judicial attempts to interpret these concepts or to distinguish clearly among
them [torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment] in case law have proven difficult."
Torture in the Eighties: an Amnesty International Report, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
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and degrading treatment.2 In interpreting Article 5, the Court is faced with
the inter-relation between its six provisions, creating a threshold which
must be passed to find a violation, distinctions between differing levels of
violations, as well as many other issues relating to how far the Court is
willing to go in interpreting this broadly written article.
II. STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
The American Convention on Human Rights protects the integrity of
persons in very broad terms, and explicitly includes not only the physical
integrity but also the psychological and moral integrity of persons. Article
5(l) establishes that "[e]very person has the right to have his physical,
mental, and moral integrity respected. " 3
Other treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), do not specifically list psychological and moral
integrity in their texts. However, in the case of the ICCPR, the related
United Nations Human Rights Committee stated in its General Comments
on the Convention that the prohibition against torture or cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment "[r]elates not only to acts that cause physical pain
but also to acts that cause mental suffering to the victim. "' Therefore,
although the text of the American Convention is more explicit than other
conventions in its inclusion of non-physical integrity, this conception of
personal integrity is recognized in other systems.
Although the European Convention on Human Rights does not
explicitly include psychological and moral suffering, the European Court of
Human Rights has also interpreted its personal integrity provisions to
include protection against moral suffering and degrading treatment that
creates a sense of fear, anxiety and inferiority in order to humiliate,
degrade and break the victim's resistance.' This European standard
including psychological trauma has been cited and adopted by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in a recent case.6
The American Convention also prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment, in the common terms of other human rights
2. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 ILM 673, OEA/Ser.
K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65. rev. 1, corr. 1, (1970) [hereinafter The Convention], art. 5.
3. Id. art. 5(1).
4. M. Cherif Bassiouni, General Comment 20 on Article 7. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.,
44th Sess., at 24-25.
5. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1975).
6. Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of September 17, 1997. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 33 (1997), para. 57.
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documents," and goes on in the same provision to prohibit treatment of
detained persons that does not show full respect for human dignity.8
The remaining provisions of Article 5 deal with the further rights of
detainees to be separated based on conviction or pre-trial status and age,
and lays out reform and rehabilitation as the only proper goal of
imprisonment. These provisions, and the right for detainees to be treated
with the respect due human dignity in Article 5(2) are rights usually
thought of separately from the right to be free of torture and cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment. 9
For example, the ICCPR lists torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment in Article 7 and the rights of detained persons in
Article 10.10 However, the practice of the Human Rights Committee,
which hears complaints based on that treaty, has been to find violations of
both of these two provisions when detainees have been found to have been
tortured or suffered cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment." The
Committee also has found that treatment due detainees under Article 10(1)
goes further than just a prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment." It also includes ensuring conditions that are not
detrimental to their health."
This sort of consideration is important in the evaluation of the
treatment that the Inter-American Court gives to Article 5, since it also
includes provisions on the rights of prisoner and is therefore quite broad. 14
The Inter-American Court, to this date, has only ruled on violations
relating to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and conditions
and treatment that are not respectful of human dignity. The other
provisions of Article 5 have not been directly interpreted. Therefore, this
paper will focus on these provisions, which, as already noted, include
conditions of confinement cases. However, in the Court's jurisprudence,
7. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1984 Convention on
Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention
on Human Rights.
8. The Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(2).
9. Id. art. 5(2).
10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 7 and 10. [hereinafter
ICCPRJ.
11. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol,
2nd - 16th Sess, U.N. CCPC/CIOP/1, Communication. No. 4 (1977) Communication. No. 5
(1977), No. 8/1977. See also Committee's decision in Communication no. 161 (1983) 31st Sess.
12. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol
(2nd - 16th Sessions), U.N. CCPC/C/OP/1, Communication No. 5 (1977).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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as discussed further below, distinctions between the different types of
violations of these provisions are not always clear. This lack of clarity
may lead to difficulty when the further provisions of Article 5 are reached,
since these provisions would naturally include violations that do not reach
the level of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or torture.
III. CREATING A THRESHOLD FOR VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES
5(1) AND 5(2)
With respect to violations of Article 5(1) and (2), it is important to
initially address separately the first two provisions and to establish a
minimum threshold which must be crossed in the treatment of the victims
in order to show their personal integrity has been violated or that they have
suffered torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 5  Some
punishment is necessary in criminal systems, but the Convention
establishes that certain types of punishments, conditions, and treatments of
any person are restricted in order to preserve the sacredness of the human
person. This right is so fundamental that, unlike other important rights, no
exceptions to the right to humane treatment are allowed, even under a state
of emergency or war.1 6 Ironically, even the right to life can be excepted,
particularly in the American Convention, which provides for the death
penalty. 17
Therefore, an important task is the creation of a threshold, which can
incorporate even the most minor violations of these two provisions of the
article and which can never be crossed without condemnation.18 The
creation of a substantive, legal threshold which must be reached in order to
hold a State responsible is a task which sometimes becomes blurred in the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court with the level of proof necessary
to prove the facts underlying these violations.
The extensive protections provided in Article 5 leave an interpretation
of this article available that could be quite broad in its protection of the
individual rights it enshrines. With its definition of the integrity to be
15. See The Convention, supra note 2.
16. The Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(2), See also, Hans Haug, Revista International
de la Cruz Roja, 'Instrnuentos de Derecho Internacional Pgblico para Ljchar contra la Tortura,
Aflo 14, No. 91, enero-febrero 1989, at 10-11 (discussing article 7 of the ICCPR); Ireland v.
United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser A) (1978), Judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A, No.
25.
17. Despite its abolitionist provisions which do not allow expansion or reinstitution of the
death penalty, the Convention provides for the continuance of the death penalty in countries that
establish it prior to signing on to the Convention. See The Convention, supra note 2.
18. Torture in the Eighties: An Amnesty International Report, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, at 15; See also Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser A) (1978).
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protected as that of the whole being rather than physical torture alone,
modern psychological and other tortures can easily be covered 9 as well as
physical mistreatments. Further, though the provisions cover the more
egregious "tortures," which call to the mind a special degree of disgust, it
also covers any treatment which is cruel, inhuman or degrading to the
physical, mental or moral integrity of the person.
Yet the threshold of what can constitute a violation of personal
integrity under this article does not stop with this type of treatment, but
further restricts the treatment that can be forced on a detainee to that which
is respectful of human dignity. Since the provision already includes
"degrading treatment," in order to read this provision to have some
purpose, it would appear that the meaning would be of a treatment that
might or might not reach the level covered by "degrading treatment."
Thus, it could be found that the article restricts more treatments than just
those that reach the level of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
A further interpretation of Article 5(1) and (2) could also incorporate
Article 5(6), with regard to prisoners, and could find further protections in
the mandate that the deprivation of their liberty can have no other purpose
than rehabilitation and reform. A violation of Article 5 could be held to be
inherent in any incarceration that does not live up to this standard,
including possibly any incommunicado holding, disappearance, or other
illegal detention since no arbitrary detention could truly have reform or
rehabilitation as its goal. With regard to disappearances, in the Velfisquez
Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases, the Court found a presumed violation
of Article 5. Also, the Court has previously ruled that the condition of
incommunicado alone is enough to violate the prohibition against cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment.' However, the Court has not always
followed these decisions.
IV. THRESHOLD FOR PRESUMPTIONS OF ARTICLE 5 VIOLATIONS AND
ISSUES OF PROOF
The Court has not yet articulated a presumption based on Article 5(6).
However, it has found in several cases that a presumption that the threshold
for Article 5(1) and 5(2) violations exists with regard to certain types of
detention.
Clearly from its first treatment of forced disappearances in Velasquez
Rodrfguez and Godinez Cruz, the Court found, without any direct evidence
19. "The methods of torture are either physical or psychological." Lone Jacobsen &
Peter Vesti, Torture Survivors-A New Group of Patients: The Danish Nurses' Org. (1990).
20. Suirez Rosero v. Ecuador, Judgment of November 12, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 35 (1997); See also Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6.
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of a violation to physical well-being, that a violation of Article 5 could be
presumed in disappearance cases given the psychological and moral effects
of being held incommunicado and the prolonged isolations which are
inherently part of a disappearance.21 The Court noted that these violations
constituted cruel and inhuman treatment and injured the personal integrity
of the victim and the right of detained persons to be treated in a way
respectful of human dignity.' From this case it is clear that mental and
emotional forms of ill-treatment are clearly being accepted by the Court, in
line with the Convention's protection of a broadly defined personal
integrity, which includes the psychological and moral aspects in addition to
the physical.
The threshold for the Court's finding of a violation in disappearances,
it would have appeared from this case, was therefore the isolation which is
inherent in a disappearance. This inherent violation passed the legal
threshold to include both disrespect for human dignity and cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment. However, in a similar case where disappearance
was once again proven, the Court found only that human dignity had been
disrespected and did not find cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.?
The Court did not refer in that case to the isolation inherent in a
disappearance but rather to the fact, which had been proven by eyewitness
accounts, that the victim had been put into the trunk of a vehicle.'
Similarly in the Paniagua Morales case, although the Court declared
the existence of the practice of forced disappearance and illegal detention
accompanied by mistreatment and torture,' it would not presume the
existence of violations of Article 5 with regard to these violations, despite
its previous decision in the Velfisquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases. 26
Therefore, some of the victims were not found to have had their Article 5
rights violated despite the incommunicado nature of their detention.
This is especially confusing in light of the Court's emphasis on this
type of isolation in the Sufrez Rosero and Loayza Tamayo cases which
both concerned incommunicado detentions. These cases tend to follow,
and in the case of the Su~rez Rosero case, explicitly states, ideas similar to
21. Vellsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras. Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 4 (1988), paras. 156, 187.
22. Id.
23. Castillo Paez v. Peru, Judgment of November 3, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 34 (1997), para. 66.
24. Id.
25. Paniagua Morales v. Guatemala, Judgment of March 8, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 37 (1998), para. 89(a).
26. Id. para. 134-135.
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that of the Velfsquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases: That isolation
alone constitutes a treatment disrespectful of human dignity and cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment. 27 Further, the Court has cited the
European Court's decision that stated that illegal detention is an
aggravating factor given the vulnerability of the victim in these
circumstances. 28
These cases seemingly rejected a prior case that had possibly limited
the presumption that arbitrary detention and isolation inherently violate
Article 5. In the Gangaran Panday case, the Court found that in the
absence of definitive proof of mistreatment of the victim, who committed
suicide during his detention which the Court determined was arbitrary and
illegal based on inference of fact did not permit it to presume violations of
Articles 5(1) and 5(2) based purely on the arbitrary nature of the
detention.29
Moreover, given the lack of proof of torture or mistreatment of others
by government officials, the Court found that the applicants had not
demonstrated a governmental practice from which the Court could presume
the victim was tortured or mistreated' 3 The refusal to use a similar
presumption in this case was based on the fact that no pattern of
mistreatment was shown nor specifically any mistreatment of the victim.
With regard to cases where the Court has not used its presumption
despite the existence of a proven pattern or practice of isolated detentions
and mistreatment of detainees, the Court instead weighed the medical
evidence of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment it had
available.31 The victims who did not present medical reports showing
physical signs of ill-treatment were found to have not suffered it. Given
the difficulty of obtaining medical evidence, especially if one is held for
some time or tortured using techniques that do not leave easily identified
signs,32 the Court's failure to use presumptions may have an impact on
future cases. This may be especially true, since the Court has sometimes
27. See generally, Sulrez Rosero, supra note 20 and Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6.
28. Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6. pan. 57, citing Ribitsch v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H. R.,
(ser. A) (1995).
29. Gangaram Panday v. Suriname, Judgment of January 21, 1994, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 16 (1994).
30. Id. para. 64.
31. See Paniagua Morales, supra note 26.
32. Henry Kruger, EVIDENCE OF TORTURE: STUDIES BY THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
MEDICAL GROUP 7 (1977).
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been unwilling to find contested facts to be proven based solely on the
testimony of the victim.33
In cases where specific mistreatment of the victims was shown, the
Court has still been willing to find that this was the responsibility of the
State. However, the Paniagua Morales case tends to set up a standard that
a pattern and specific medical evidence of the mistreatment should be
shown rather than just showing a connection to the pattern of
disappearances or illegal detentions which included such mistreatment.
In SuArez Rosero, the Court was faced with a living victim whose
testimony and that of his family included claims of beatings,
incommunicado detention, and poor conditions of conf'mement. 34 The
Court could not specifically use the European standard that an injury
proven to have occurred while in the sole custody of the State is presumed
to be caused by the State. However, absent a sufficient rebuttal,35 the
Court did find that given the incommunicado nature of the first part of his
detention, only the victim and the State could have evidence.3 Therefore,
without evidence to the contrary offered by the State, the Court would give
weight to the testimony and claims of the victim.37
In other words, after proving isolated detention and making initial
Article 5 claims the burden shifted to the State to show the claims were
untrue. Such a shift of the burden of proof is in line with the nature of
these detentions recognized in the prior cases that established the
presumption of Article 5 violations in disappearance cases. Thus, not only
has the Court on occasion found cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
and disrespect to human dignity based solely on isolation, but it also has
used isolation to shift the burden of proof in attempting to prove other,
more egregious, violations.
33. See Paniagua Morales, supra note 26 (despite the fact that the Court found the
victims had been detained in a pattern that included beatings and mistreatment and that the
Commission had argued any injury claimed in custody should be found to be the responsibility of
the State absent a rebuttal, the Court denies claims of those who do not present actual medical
evidence of their allegations); Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6, para. 58 on the issue of rape; But
see, Sudrez Rosero, supra note 20 para. 33 (Court discusses in a case where the State did not
rebut the victim's allegations that the State is the party that has access to the facts).
34. SuArez Rosero, supra note 20, para. 23.
35. The European Court found that in a case where it was undisputed that injuries were
sustained during detention by the police that the government was "under an obligation to provide a
plausible explanation of how the applicant's injuries were caused." Ribitsch v. Austria, 336 Eur.
Ct. H. R (Ser.A) (1995), para. 34.
36. Sudrez Rosero, spra note 20, para. 33.
37. Id.
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The United Nations Human Rights Committee has addressed this issue
by stating the following:
With regard to the burden of proof, the Committee has already
established in other cases (for example, Nos. 30/1978 and
85/1981) that this cannot rest alone on the author of the
communication, especially considering that the author and the
State party do not always have equal access to the evidence and
that frequently the State party alone has access to relevant
information. In those circumstances, due weight must be given to
the author's allegations.'
This decision was based on the obligation of the State to investigate
such allegations fully, presumably because if the State had fulfilled this
obligation it would have had the information necessary to rebut or explain
the allegations. Since this obligation exists in the Inter-American System
as well, this conception of the burden of proof should be equally relevant
in the Court's analysis. The Court's first decision is evidence of this,
given its statement that the States "[c]annot rely on the defense that the
complainant has failed to present evidence when it cannot be obtained
without the State's cooperation."" A combination of this flexibility in the
burden of proof and the presumptions can go a long way in remedying the
problems facing victims in establishing their claims of mistreatment.
V. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN TORTuRE AND CRUEL, INHUMANE AND
DEGRADING TREATMENT
Once the threshold or presumption has been met, which is perhaps the
most important step in the interpretation, it also becomes important to
determine the various levels of violation possible under Article 5. This is
important for many reasons. First, the State must not only be condemned
for a "violation of Article 5" but should also be stigmatized by the labels
38. Supra note 4.
39. Velasquez Rodrfguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 4 (1988). In this and the other Honduras Case of Godfnez Cruz, the Court defined
the standard of proof necessary to prove violations of the rights contained in the American
Convention in a way that allowed the applicant to show a governmental practice of violations and
a link between the individual case brought and the practice through circumstantial evidence and
presumptions consistent with the facts. The Court noted that, given that "[s]tates do not appear
before the Court as defendants in a criminal action," and further that the purpose of the
proceedings was "[tlo protect the victims and to provide for the reparation of damages resulting
from the acts of the States responsible" for violations of their rights the Court has more flexibility
than domestic criminal courts in determining the criteria for weighing evidence. Id. paras. 127,
128 and 134.
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which truly mark the atrocities it has committed. If a state has allowed,
condoned, or participated actively in "torture," it should be condemned for
this practice by name by the international community and not allowed to
escape with a less stigmatizing label.' While all violations are to be
condemned and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is as violatory of
the Convention as torture, the severity of the violation must not be
overlooked.
Not only should the Court look to condemn violations generally but,
because the Inter-American system is based on individual complaints, the
horrors committed against each victim should be discovered, where
possible, and condemned, even if it is easier to stop at a simple crossing of
the threshold and a general denunciation. Through this recognition, the
State can be asked to compensate the victim for the extent of their suffering
and also so that the judgment can serve as what the Court often sees as the
per se international recognition of the responsibility of the State for the
atrocities committed.4'
One major distinction that can be drawn is between torture and cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment. The European Court has distinguished
succinctly between these two types of violations in its groundbreaking,
although criticized,42 case of Ireland v. United Kingdom. In that case, the
European Court found that the various forms of ill-treatment should be
separated and defined individually. The writers of the European
Convention, that Court noted, meant to give meaning to all the parts of the
prohibition and therefore each must be seen as adding something to the
provisions. The term "torture", they found, carried a special "stigma"
which should be applied to "deliberate inhuman treatment causing very
serious and cruel suffering. "4 As noted above, it is because of this stigma
that it is important for the determination of which form of violation has
occurred in each case, even though all violations should be condemned.
This idea that torture is a more grave form of cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment is supported by the United Nation's definition of
torture, which the European Court cites, that calls torture "an aggravated
and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
40. Even Amnesty International. whose report calls for all violations to be condemned
regardless of distinctions, recognizes the special stigma inherent in the term "torture. " TORTURE
iN THE FIGHTIEs, supra note 1, at 15.
41. The Court has often denied requests by the Commission and victims for an apology
or public announcement by the State. stating that its judgment by itself constitutes international
recognition of responsibility.
42. Torture in the Eighties, supra note 18 at 14-15.
43. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H. .R.(ser. A) (1978), supra note 18, para.
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punishment. "" However, as the Ireland case shows, the European Court
used this criteria to detern "e that the infamous "five techniques"
complained of in that case were not of the "intensity" that the word torture
implies,4" and instead deemed them cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment.' Such an approach, which is followed by the Inter-American
Court in its cases,47 has been criticized for making the lower threshold of
what constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment severe enough to
be called "torture. ,48
This approach also requires the use of a case-by-case analysis which
leaves the Courts open to criticisms of subjectiveness and a lack of
objective factors.49 However, as the comments of the United Nations
Human Rights Committee regarding the torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment article of the ICCPR states:
[Tihat Covenant does not contain any definition of the concepts
covered by Article 7 [the torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment article], nor does the Committee consider it
necessary to draw up a list of prohibited acts or to establish sharp
distinctions between the different kinds of punishment or
treatment; the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and
severity of the treatment applied.5°
This is similar to the approach of the European Court and leaves
the judging body discretion to make distinctions based on any criteria it
deems relevant to its determination.
The Inter-American Court has followed a similar path, although at
times its distinctions and interpretations of what fits within the terms of the
Convention have been inconsistent and confusing. The Court, based on the
structure of Article 5(1) and (2) discussed above, has used different
distinctions: torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and
treatment disrespectful of human dignity.
With Loayza Tamayo, the Court found that the victim had some
medical evidence and witnesses that testified to abuses similar to those she
44. d.
45. Id.
46. Id. para. 168.
47. Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6, para. 57.
48. Torture in the Eighties, supra note 1, at 15.
49. La Integridad Personal en el Derecho Internacional (A prop6sito de ia Convenci6n de
las Naciones Uniones contra la tortura), Miguel Villavicencio C., Boleffn Coinisi6n Andina de
Juristas, matzo 1990, No. 24, 28-29.
50. Supra note 4.
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complained of suffering in the same prison." The victim complained in
this case of traditional torture techniques such as "submarine torture,"
beatings and sexual torture, yet the Court found only cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment based on the facts it considered proven.52 However,
the Court did find the State responsible for cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment based on the other claims including conditions of confinement,
the incommunicado nature of her detention, beatings and other
mistreatments.53
The Court did include in this case recognition that different grades of
violations from torture to other lesser types.' The Court also noted the
European Court's definitions of inhumane treatment and degrading
treatment as including psychological suffering, but did not make a point of
distinguishing strictly between "inhuman" and "degrading" treatment as the
European Court has.55 While recognizing as well that illegal detention
aggravates the vulnerability of the detained person,' the Court does not use
this aggravating factor to find torture rather than cruel, inhuman and
degading treatment.
In determining the distinction between the three different types of
violations used by the Court, several other cases are also illustrative. In
the Paniagua Morales case, the Court had three different types of victims
with regard to Article 5.57 All victims had been arbitrarily kidnapped and
held prisoner, although as previously mentioned, the presumption that this
isolation constituted ill-treatment of any kind was not mentioned by the
Court. The first set of victims had been held and had not, in the Court's
criteria, proven any violence against them or poor conditions of
confinement despite claims by some of them that they were beaten.5 The
Court rejected their allegations of Article 5 violations.59 For those victims
who had survived the detention and had shown the Court medical proof of
beatings, the Court determined they had been subjected to cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment.'
51. Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6.
52. Id. paras. 58 and 46.
53. Id. para. 58.
54. Id.
55. Id. paras. 58 and 57. See also Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H. R.,(ser. A)
(1978).
56. Id. para. 57.
57. Paniagua Morales, supra note 26.
58. Id. para. 66.
59. Id. para. 135.
60. Id.
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The victims who had been murdered by their captors, for whom the
Court had the autopsy reports which showed the treatment of the victims
before their deaths, and given the gravity of the suffering obviously caused
by the treatment shown in these reports, were deemed to have been
tortured.6' Given that the particular violations in the case of the deceased
victims were especially gruesome, ' this decision was not a difficult one
with regard to whether it was "intense" enough to qualify under the test for
"torture."
This intensity test, which is similar to the European Court's, was
adopted by the Inter-American Court to distinguish between "torture" and
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,' although the Court does not
distinguish between cruel, inhuman and degrading as the European Court
has done. 64 The intensity standard, as mentioned previously, can be
criticized based on its subjectivity. However, the Court seemed to prefer
not to list a more specific definition.
As with any subjective standard, the facts of each case must be
weighed in order to determine if a violation has occurred, and if so, what
level it reaches. This raises another serious issue in physical integrity
cases: what is necessary to prove the facts involved? As noted above,
torture and its various techniques are not always easy to demonstrate
medically, and this can be especially true in cases involving long detentions
where access to a doctor can be restricted or where the victim is too afraid
to seek medical attention immediately. Therefore, in any discussion of
torture and the various levels of violations to physical integrity rights, the
related standard of proof issues must be addressed both in terms of the
Court's general standard of proof and that concerning Article 5
specifically.
VI. OTHER ARTICLE 5 ISSUES TREATED BY THE COURT
A greater number of cases coming before the Court each year include
more varied violations (other than disappearances and right to life).
Therefore, the Court should begin to reach those issues which it may have
found easier to dismiss in earlier cases where the more "obvious" or
"egregious" violations made it possible to dismiss the lesser or more
complicated claims while still finding the State responsible. Some issues
61. Id. para. 134.
62. The autopsy reports showed that the victims' injuries included near-decapitation,
removal of fingernails, bruises, non-fatal cuts (including one in the shape of a cross), etc. Id.
para. 66.
63. Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6, para. 57.
64. Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 18.
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dealing with Article 5 outside of the Court's standard disappearance and
detention cases have been raised in past cases, though many more exist and
will eventually need to be confronted by the Court.
In a case where the more egregious violations were not under the
Court's jurisdiction, the Court was confronted with claims concerning the
Article 5 rights of the family of a disappearance victim whose
disappearance was covered-up by the State. These rights, creatively, were
found to be violated since the disappearance and burning of the body of
their family member directly caused suffering and gravely affected their
lives .'
The Inter-American Court has not adequately addressed the distinction
between direct and indirect victims, and this becomes apparent in this
expansion of Article 5 rights to psychological and moral integrity of
relatives of the primary victim, which the Blake case finds to be directly
affected by violations to another person. However, this finding has not
been used in other cases to find family members to be direct victims where
the primary crime was under the Court's jurisdiction, which gives the
unfortunate impression that the Court was simply extending this
interpretation in the Blake case because of its finding that the victim's
disappearance could not be adjudicated because it occurred before the
violating State became a Party to the jurisdiction of the Court.'
In another important area that might be covered under Article 5, the
Court has not yet directly addressed the death row phenomenon which is
said to cause mental anguish to prisoners awaiting death sentences. This
issue, faced by the European Court in the famous Soering case, has been
raised before the Court in its decision on provisional measures in a matter
involving death row prisoners in Trinidad and Tobago.' While the State
argued that the Court should not ask it to delay their executions further
because of internal time limits established to avoid the "cruel and unusual
punishment" of extended death row stays, the Court did not reach this issue
and ordered the stay of execution without any discussion of this substantive
issue raised by the State.'
With regard to whether violations of Article 5 can be found in a case
where death is presumed to have occurred and whether a violent death
might be considered to violate Article 5 represented two issues that were
65. Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment of January 24, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 36 (1998), paras. 112-116.
66. Id. paras. 2and3.
67. James et al. Case, Order of August 29, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Provisional
Measures adopted by the Court in the Matter of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Having
Seen 5(c) and Considering.
68. Id.
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addressed by the Court in the Neira Alegria case.6 In that case, involving
the disappearance of prisoners during a prison riot, the Court decided to
reject the argument of the Inter-American Commission that the right to not
be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment was violated,
without evidence that such treatment occurred during the alleged detention
of the victim.' Further, the Court concluded that "[w]hile the deprivation
of a person's life could also be understood as an injury to his or her
personal integrity, this is not the meaning of [Article 5] of the
Convention."71 This concept, that Article 5 does not refer to all injuries to
the victim's body even in the case of a disappearance implies that an
element of prolonged suffering is part of the Court's definition of the
treatments included in the prohibitions of Article 5.
The Court has been reluctant also in issues that affect women. For
example, in the Loayza Tamayo case, the Court did not find for the victim
on her claims of sexual tortures, thereby dodging an important and well-
recognized type of torture. 2 The Court, which has only had one female
member since its creation, must overcome whatever timidity it has to
dealing with women's issues. This will be especially true not only given
the use of sexual tortures against women and men, but also for other
Article 5 issues which may arise later. For example, whether a state could
be found responsible for domestic violence (an assault to personal integrity
rights) in its jurisdiction if the State condones it or does not attempt to.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court must continue to clarify its interpretation of
Article 5(l) and 5(2). A threshold for violating these first two provisions
should be clearly established, and presumptions should be used to allow
victims to meet this threshold based on the nature of their detentions which
can make them especially vulnerable to physical violence as well as
inherently causing them mental and moral anguish. At least, a shift in the
burden of proof as in the Sufirez Rosero case should occur in these
situations. The burden of proof should be clearly established but should
not overburden the victim, since, as the Court has noted, it is often only
the State that holds access to proof other than the victim's testimony.
Deciding where the threshold of a violation lies and the distinctions
between the different levels of violations (lack of respect for human
69. Neira Alegria v. Perui, Judgment of January 19, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 20 (1995).
70. Id. para. 86.
71. Id.
72. Torture Survivors, supra note 19.
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dignity, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, or torture) are subjective,
evolving along with society's conceptions, and will always, therefore, be
open to criticism. However, the stigma inherent in the terms themselves
should be used to vindicate the victim and recognize the extent of the
State's responsibility. More complicated situations and types of violations
must be addressed fully. The Court should not stop at simply crossing the
threshold without condemning all of the violations it can find in any given
case.
The Court will surely be faced with various types of violations of
Article 5. Cases involving detainees' rights will surely also follow and the
Court must be clear on its interpretation of the first two provisions of
Article 5 in order to prepare itself to deal with the overlapping remaining
provisions which will have their own, presumably lower, threshold of
mistreatment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this essay is to provide a review of the doctrine and
jurisprudence of the expert testimony as a probatory medium' used by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICHR, Court, Tribunal) in the
issues presented before it. It is a universally accepted legal principle that
courts have the duty of initiating the investigation of the facts presented
before them in order to achieve proper administration of justice. The
ICHR is not foreign to this obligation, not only because it is an
international court, but because of its fundamental knowledge and essential
nature to modem societies, it seeks the international protection of human
rights.
Article 44 of the Rules of Procedure of the ICHR, relating to the
probatory diligences, officiously grants broad powers to the Court when
asserting that:
mhe Court may, at any stage of the proceedings:
1. Obtain, on its own motion, any evidence it considers
helpful. In particular, it may hear a witness, expert witness, or in
any other capacity, any person whose evidence, statement or
opinion it deems to be relevant;
2. Invite the parties to provide any evidence at their disposal
or any explanation or statement that, in its opinion, may be
useful;
* Graduated from the Facultad de Derecho of the Universidad de Costa Rica in 1986.
Currently, an attorney at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
1. Cafferata Nores, Jose I., LA PRUEBA EN EL PROCESO PENAL 21 (Ed. Depalma
1986). "[The means of proof is the process established by Law intended to result in admission
of the element of proof in the process." (Editorial Note: Translated from Spanish).
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3. Request any entity, office, organ or authority of its choice
to obtain information, express an opinion, or deliver a report or
pronouncement on any given point. The documents may not be
published without the authorization of the Court;
4. Commission one or more of its members to conduct an
inquiry, undertake an in situ investigation or obtain evidence in
some other manner.2
When it is so authorized by law that the Court, by its own motion, will
procure every proof that it considers useful to request from the parties,
entities, offices and authorities, the general legal principle of Freedom of
Proof,3 made up of principles of freedom of object of proof,4 and Freedom
of Means of Proof, basis of every probative system and narrowly linked
to the valuation pursuant to the rules of constructive rational criticism, are
welcomed.6
That pragmatic intention is derived from what is set forth in the
Preamble of the American Convention on Human Rights, when it states
that the American states signatories of the Convention have the "[i] ntention
to consolidate in this hemisphere, within the framework of democratic
institutions, a system of personal liberty and social justice based on respect
2. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RULES OF PROCEDURE,
OEAISer. L/V/111.3, doc. 13, corr.1 (1981), reprinted in 20 ILM 1289 (1980) [hereinafter The
Rules].
3. Alfredo Vdlez Mariconde, DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL 198 (Ed. Lerner). Views said
principle in this manner: "The principle itself allows the penal process to follow the norm that
everything can be proven and through any means, except that which the law specifically prohibits,
which occurs in exceptional circumstances." (Editorial Note: Translated from Spanish).
4. The freedom of the object of proof is recognized as the doctrine of Thema
Probandum, but it is a freedom understood in terms that the events concern the process thus are in
the Judge's interest in the formation of his conviction.
5. The freedom of medium of proof is the possibility of appealing to any source of proof
relating to the truth of the events to create the conviction or reasoning of the judge. Some
legislation as sectors of the doctrine sustained the principle of the limitation in the mediums of
proof, allowing in the process only those results that the law expressly indicates. Nevertheless,
said proposition is not commonly shared and article 44 of the Rules of Procedures does not
provide for such limitation.
6. V61lez Mariconde, supra note 3, at 361-363. "The method of free conviction or
rational criticism (both formulas have the same meaning), consist in that the law does not impose
general norms to credit some delinquent facts (as those relating to the body of the crime) nor does
it determine the value of the evidence abstractly, but rather it gives freedom to the trier of fact to
admit all evidence found to be useful to the clarification of the truth (in principle, everything can
be proven and by any means), and to appreciate it according to the rules of logic, psychology, and
experience." (Editorial Note: Translated from Spanish).
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for the essential rights of man. "7 Human rights in our time have become a
sacred matter, because their recognition and respect is the basis for the
support of the people, pivotal to the socio-economic development.
In the past, the expert testimony was unknown as a probatory means
because the methods used were totally non-scientific; they were based on
religious beliefs, fear, witchcraft, etc, as evidenced in the famous trials of
God. In the mid nineteenth century, with the anthropological studies
developed by Lambroso, the beginning of a new era was marked in the
expertise field based upon an interest in knowing the causes of criminal
activity; in finding suitable means of reinstating the criminal into society as
a useful person; and in achieving more efficiency in clarifying the crimes
before the high level of existent impunity was born. These factors forced
the search of scientific methods of investigating crime.
The advanced technology developed during the end of the present
millennium, has led to the birth of new techiniques and the development of
existing techniques in the field of investigation, of which the Courts of
Justice have been witnesses. The latters have had to update themselves,
promoting the modernization of legislation and a greater demand in the
training of their officers in various fields of human knowledge. Nowdays,
we have professionals and tribunals specialized in diverse disciplines.
The enrichment of the knowledge has become so broad that it is
difficult to imagine in the early Twenty First Century the existence of
geniuses such as Miguel Angel, Leonardo Da Vinci and many others that
marked humanity's history for their in-depth and broad general culture in
multiple fields. Presently, it is impossible to have extensive knowledge in
all sciences, arts or techniques recognized by their level of development,
which has enriched this field of study.
In recent years, scientific tests have been perfected such as the carbon
40, the DNA, blood groups and other important genetic markers in the
field of the criminal, family, civil rights, as well as in other branches of the
human knowledge such as biology, genetics, paleontology, archaeology
and many others in charge of enriching the human knowledge.
Presently, the tribunals have at their disposal experts in medicine,
social sciences, mathematics, business and other fields, so that before
conflicts arise the court may utilize experts, as valuable assistants in the
administration of justice, acquiring a more important role every day and
strenghening this method of proof that is undergoing study.
It is important to divide the focus of the expert test, into a first part
which is the conceptualization of the topic and then pass to the second part,
in which reference is made to the jurisprudence and some practices of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
7. American Convention of Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 ILM 673, OEA/Ser.
K/XVI/I.1, doc. 65 rev. 1, corr. 1 (1970) para. I [hereinafter The Convention].
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I. CONCEPTUALIZATION
The definition of "expert" is uniform in the doctrine. Experts are
considered assistants to the judges' which are necessary in discovering how
to evaluate the elements of proof that are presented before them.9 It is
necessary to have a specific knowledge in a science, art or technique.' °
This knowledge should be generally unknown to the judge who, as director
of the process, will determine whether this method of proof is relevant"
and pertinent to achieve the access to the relevant information that such
elements give him. The report that the expert renders is given different
names: know-how, expert report, expert opinion or expert testimony. It is
precisely this probative means that becomes a representation of a
declaration of the expert's knowledge.
It is the duty of the judges to determine the necessity of asking for an
expert's opinion in order to add to the record the specific knowledge that
they lack. For that reason it is the judge's discretion to appoint the expert.
The parties can request the expert test, but the ultimate decision rests on
the tribunal. It is the duty of the tribunal to direct the methods of proof
selecting the expert or experts to designate and indicate the specific point in
which they must render a decision. This is why the experts have the right
8. Ricardo C. Nufiez, C6DIGO PROCESAL PENAL PROVINCIA DE CORDOBA 230 (Marcos
Lerner Eds. 1986). "The expertise is not like a testimony, an independent probatory element, but
it always works as an accessory to establish or guarantee the existence or value of the evidence
that cannot be noticed or appreciated thoroughly by means of observation and common
knowledge." (Editorial Note: Translated from Spanish).
9. CAFFERATA NOREs, at 14. "Element of proof, or proof, is all objective fact that is
legally incorporated to the process, capable of producing a certain or probable knowledge about
the particulars of the criminal imputation." (Editorial Note: Translated from Spanish).
10. Id. at 47. "The expert testimony is the means of proof used to obtain an opinion
based in specialized scientific, technical, or artistic knowledge; useful for the discovery and
understanding of the elements of proof." See also Victor De Santo, COMPENDIO DE DERECHO
PROCESAL CIVIL, COMERCIAL, PENAL Y LABORAL (Ed. Universidad 1995). "The expert, as
noted, is an advisor that offers to the judges their specialized culture, different from the general
and judicial of that of the judges...." See also Eduardo J. Couture, VOCABULARIO JURIDICO
146 (Ed. DePalma). "Assistants of justice, are those who, in exercising a public function or a
private activity, are called upon to give an opinion about issues relating to their science, art or
practice, thereby advising judges in subject matters foreign to the judges." (Editorial Note:
Translated from Spanish).
11. 1 GIOVANNI LEONE, TRATADO DE DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL 181 (Ed. Jurfdicas
Europa-Am6rica, 1963). "Relevancy of proof means its contribution to the verification in course.
This contribution does not necessarily have to be direct or immediate, even allowing it to be only
gradual (thus, providing circumstances may be relevant in establishing the credibility of a
witness). Relevancy of the proof means its possibility to concur, including mediate and indirectly,
to proving; in substance, more than a positive characterization, it is a negative characterization, in
the sense that it excludes evidence totally superfluous." (Editorial Note: Translated from
Spanish).
Monge
of accessing the judicial file in which will be rendering their opinion as
well as to the existent elements of proof. Also, the parties to the process
have the right of initiative to indicate the areas in which the expert will
have to address, indicating to the tribunal their points of interest based on
the principle of burden of proof. From those points the tribunal will
choose the ones that it considers pertinent and relevant.
The judges, responsible for their decisions, will determine if it is
necessary to appoint an expert. If the judge has the necessary knowledge
over the specific case, the judge is not forced to require the appointment of
an expert. This finds its basis not only in the Principle of Procedural
Economy, but also in the fact that the expert's opinion is not binding on the
judge. Instead, the judge will appreciate said opinion pursuant to the rules
of logic.12
The expert, as a technician, will have to have a professional title in the
area in which he will render an opinion, except for those cases in which the
discipline is not regulated. In the absence of said regulation, the tribunal
shall apply a proper criteria in the selection, based on the experience,
reputation, published studies, and experience in similar situations.'
If the expert opinion results in the fulfillment of irreproducible facts, it
is necessary pursuant to the norms of due process and defense that the
tribunal notify the parties and allow them to witness these studies, even
with the assistance of their technical consultants. 4 Therefore, the experts
have to be notified by the tribunal about the necessity of communicating
any act that is deemed to be impossible to reproduce in order that the
parties may control the expert's work. In those cases in which the expert's
opinion does not result in the fulfillment of irreproducible facts, the expert
will render his opinion and the tribunal will grant the pertaining hearing to
the parties so that they can make the necessary findings; requesting
12. William Corujo Guardia, Percia: Su Valoraci6n Cdtica, 2 REVISTA URUGUAYA DE
DERECHO PROCESAL 298 (1991). "The Expert is not the main subject of the process thus he is not
concerned with outlining the Thema Decidendum (function of the parties) or to solve it (the
Judge's function); his opinion is not binding and this approach has been sustained unanimously by
Doctrine and Jurisprudence." (Editorial Note: Translated from Spanish).
13. Ernesto Abreu G6mez, Peito y peritajes, 9 REViSTA CRIMINALIA 572 (1969). "The
expert testimony presumes in the person that will render it, the expert, an exact wisdom of the
subject to be dealt with; that is not only what the expert requires, the expert requires an exact and
concised knowledge in the field that he will study; under these conditions, it is very natural for the
expert to be a person, recognized publicly as an expert in the field. But another attribute is still
needed: Honesty. Honesty in experts is a basic commodity." (Editorial Note: Translated from
Spanish).
14. The technical consultant is appointed by the interested parties to assist them and
collaborate with the defense of their interests and is overseen by the attorney; it is important to
note that it is a technical advisor unlike the lawyer who works with the legal part and is
responsible for his client's interests.
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additions, clarifications, and even, requesting another expert in case of a
dispute.
The tribunal, as director of the process, will warn the expert of the
obligation to avoid destroying, altering or in any other way modifying the
elements of proof that are the subject of analysis. Therefore, if any of the
aforementioned situations occur, the expert will need to have the pertaining
authorization of the tribunal.
The expert should be warned when accepting the job, of his obligation
of not communicating to the parties or any third party, the results of his
conclusions and studies because the tribunal is entitled to be the first to
know. As a result, we enter in the realm of loyalty to the tribunal,
departing from the thesis that in the event of a violation of this obligation,
the tribunal has the authority to annul the opinion as a consequence of the
appointment that the same gave. It is considered that the expert should also
maintain this loyalty after presenting his study, since the comments and
opinions given off the record to parties of the process or to third parties
endangers the judgment and its objectivity.
What derives from what is stated above is the fact that the expert
opinions should be ordered by the competent tribunal to have probatory
value. As a result, those carried out beforehand by the parties, such as the
preparation of a demand or answer, lack of probatory effectiveness for
being extrajudicial, in which case the parties may present them as
testimonial proof.
When an expert is appointed, he must formally appear before the
tribunal by making a written presentation within the terms granted to show
his acceptance of the position and to swear to complete it faithfully. In this
manner the expert is notified of his obligation of fulfilling his obligations
with strict objectivity, thus giving clear, precise and sustainable statements
in his opinion, never making assumptions or presumptions. In the event he
is forced to make assumptions or presumptions he will explain the reasons
for doing so."5
In some cases, because of the nature of the required expertise, the
tribunal must appoint several experts so that they can elaborate on the
15. 3 JORGE CLARIA OLMEDO, TRATADO DE DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL 331 (Ediar
S.A. Ed. 1961). "The expert produces his opinion in an objective manner, giving rise to the
conclusions as way of making intelligible an element of proof for which direct observation
presented difficulties or left serious doubts about its significance." See also 2 HERNALDo DEVIS
ECHANDIA, TEORIA GENERAL PRUEBA JUDICIAL 321, provides that "[the foundation of the
probatory merit of the expert testimony resides in a concrete presumption, for the particular case,
that the expert is sincere, truthful and possibly correct in his conclusion, when he is an honest,
capable person, expert in the field; who has also carefully studied the problem presented for his
consideration, has carried out his perceptions of the facts or of the probatory material of the trial
with efficiency and has given his opinion on such perceptions and deductions that are concluded
thanks to the technical, scientific or artistic rules of expertise known and applied to those ends, in
an explained, motivated, and convincing matter." (Editorial Note: Translated from Spanish).
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commended studies. In such cases, there is an implicit obligation in the
experts to administer the tests jointly and to make their deliberations in a
secret manner, drawing the opinion jointly if agreed upon. Otherwise, it
should be done separately.
Today, the possibility that the expert's opinions be rendered by public
and private juridical entities is broadly accepted. Consequently, it is
common practice to request expert opinions from auditing companies and
universities that carry out studies in diverse fields, such as agronomy,
medicine, and pharmacy. Nevertheless, in order for the expert opinion to
have probatory value, the interveners should accept the position and be
properly sworn in by the tribunal, because otherwise, their probatory value
would change," to either documental or testimonial proof.
In disputes where differences exist, like in an agrarian matter, the
expertise of institutes is usually required to determine the agricultural
vocation of country property. The most common cases in the judicial
practice are in the areas of criminal, family and labor law, which studies in
psychology, psychiatry, labor medicine, and trauma are required. In other
areas they are requested from established public institutions and not to
experts in specific areas, since it is already by law that they are official
experts. In such cases, the experts are already properly sworn and
sufficiently notified of their responsibilities.
As a rule, the expert's opinion must be presented in writing, and
should include all observations, tests performed, methods followed,
elements of proof observed and valued as well as any detail that would
allow the Court and the parties to establish its degree of certainty. Also,
the opinion must contain a chapter with conclusions that will allow the
judges to know the final valuations to which the technician committed
himself during his study. The expert is also committed to provide all
additional information or clarification to his opinion, as well as to appear in
Court, if necessary, to provide such information and clarification orally
before the Court and the parties.
All experts, except the officials that already have an established
compensation for their work, solicited by the Tribunal acquire with the
execution of their responsibility, the right to be properly compensated for
their work, to be notified previous to the acceptance of their position of
the amount they will receive and to request, if necessary, approvals to
incur additional expenses and rearrange their fees. The above-mentioned is
an obligation of the proposing party initially so that after the resolution of
the case, when calculating the costs, the appropriate party may proceed to
16. See 2 MARiO A.ODERIGO, LECCIONES DE DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL 204 (Ed.
Depalma 1971). "Certain Juridical, public or private entities, such as academies and universities,
can be consulted about science, art, or industry, requesting from them the information that will
have certain probatory value, proportionate to the authority of the people which integrate them,
but they will represent expert testimony, in the precise legal sense." (Editorial Note: Translated
from Spanish).
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the tribunal to make the unsuccessful party pay for these costs or to absolve
it from paying such costs.
III. PRACTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
Article 44 of the ICHR's Rules of Procedure sets forth the principle of
the freedom of proof and its valuation which must conform the rules of
logic.' 7  Regarding said principle of the freedom of proof used in
jurisprudence, the ICHR is of the view that "[i]nternational jurisprudence
has recongized the power of the courts to weigh the evidence freely,
although it has avoided a rigid rule regarding the amount of proof
necessary to support a judgment. " "
Regarding the system of valuation that the ICHR has been applying,
based on the reasoned opinions, it has been established by jurisprudence
that "[tihe Court must determine what the standard of proof should be in
[each] case. Neither the Convention, the Statute of the Court nor its Rules
of Procedures speak of this matter."' 9 Indeed, after reviewing the Court's
legal instruments, we do not find any specific norm on the issue, and the
Court's case law is considered appropriate since it completely adjusts itself
to the spirit of article 44 and other modem doctrines.
The Court, when valuing the proof, has come to apply the reasoned
opinion as a criteria of valuation and has given foundation to its
application."° The jurisprudence of the Court that the valuation of the
proof according to the reasoned opinion's rules will allow the judges to
arrive to the conviction about the truth of the alleged facts. 2' The ICHR
has reinforced article 44 given its condition of international tribunal of
human rights, indicating that the criteria of appreciation of proof:
[Has] the greatest amplitude, because the determination of the
international responsibility of a State for violation of the person's
rights, allows the Tribunal a greater amount of flexibility in the
valuation of the proof rendered before it in regards to the
17. The Rules, supra note 2, art. 44.
18. Velisquez Rodrfguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 4 (1988), para. 127. See also Godfnez Cruz v. Honduras, Judgment of January 20,
1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 5 (1989), para. 133; Fair6n Garbi v. Honduras, Judgment
of March 15, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 6 (1989), para. 130.
19. Velsquez Rodrfguez, (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 127; Godlnez Cruz (Ser. C) No. 5, para.
133; Fairtn Garbi, (Ser. C) No. 6, para. 130.
20. Veliquez Rodrfguez, (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 129; Godfnez Cruz (Ser. C) No. 5, para.
135; Fairdn Garbi (Ser. C) No. 6, para. 132.
21. Paniagua Morales et al. v. Guatemala, Judgment of March 8, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 37 (1998), para. 76.
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pertaining facts, in accordance with the rules of the logic and
based on experience.
The American Convention on Human Rights as well as the Statute and
Rules of Procedure of the Court, do not adequately regulate the means of
proof commonly used in the processes before this Tribunal, such as the
documental, testimonial and expert testimony. Only in Chapter IV of its
Rules of Procedure does it refer to the topic of proof in articles 43 through
article 54 inclusive, but in a very general way, forcing the Court to resort
to the doctrine and international practice that has become concrete in each
of its decisions.
In the aforementioned chapter, in connection with the expert
testimony, it is established that the expenses will be covered by the party
that prolonges it.' It is necessary to point out that the practice has been
that the Court itself has rarely ordered an expert test. In the majority of
the cases, the interested party has been the one that has not only offered the
evidence, but also the one who has indicated the technician that the Court
will appoint as an expert so that the expert can render the opinion and also
take charge of covering the corresponding expenses.
This practice could be modified so the Court could use a list of
professionals in diverse disciplines that have been previously chosen by
means of convocation systems for the integration of the same. In this
manner, the Tribunal will appoint the expert and the interested party will
be limited to request the area of practice and to cover its expenses. This
system guarantees even more the objectivity in the realization of the expert
proof, which was conceived as auxiliary to judges and as necessary proof
when specific knowledge is required for a specific problem.
Allowing the parties to appoint the expert has led to problems in terms
of credibility of the evidence, since in some cases the experts treated
general topics instead of themes relevant to the "thema probandum" of the
matter. This is against the principle of "iura novit curia." Said practice
prevents the Tribunal from directing the expert opinion and giving it the
proper treatment. Further, this test is not that of an expert opinion, but
rather of testimonial proof, because the experts assigned in this manner are
not assistants to the Judges, but rather witnesses of the appointing party
thereby weakening the credibility of the expert testimony, since there may
be a subjective focus in the studies to convince the Tribunal, thus, lacks the
necessary objectivity that characterizes technical reports, and ultimately
hurts the administration of justice.
22. Blake v.Guatemala, Judgment of January 24, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.
36 (1998), para. 50; See also Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment September 17, 1997, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 33 (1997), para. 42; Castillo Plez v. Peru, Judgment of November 3,
1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C), No. 34 (1997), para. 39.
23. Rules, supra note 2, art. 45.
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In a number of cases, the expert testimony is presented orally at the
public hearings rather than in writing. The oral expert testimony is
inconvenient to the Court as well as for the opposing party. The Tribunal's
right to govern the expert testimony in terms of relevancy and credibility is
weakened. Additionally, it prejudices the intervening parties who will hear
an oral testimony with all its technicalities without a written copy. This
prevents a complete understanding which would allow control of the expert
testimony by means of questioning that may clarify, provide adequate
explanations, and even to determine the need for a new expert.
Indeed, expert testimony by definition is technical. Not only the
judges, but also the parties, and their lawyers lack knowledge in those
sciences, arts or techniques. Consequently, in order to provide an
adequate defense and due process rights, the parties should be allowed to
have the expert's opinion in writing so that the technical consultant may
evaluate and control what the expert stated. When the expert testimony is
presented orally at a hearing, the party's rights are limited as opposed to if
a written report would be provided which the expert must defend at the
hearing while the party is exercising the right to a defense. The party
could, for example, rebut with an opinion from another expert.
The problem of the oral expert testimony is tied to the practice that the
interested party proposes the expert, since it could generate inequalities
among the parties that affect the due process as a whole. That is because
the proposing party could have had previous comments, which would allow
it to know in advance what would be said at the public hearing.
Consequently, one party has a primary focus, which the opposing party
lacks. This results in an inequality between the parties. Said practice also
compromises the expert in his role as auxiliary of the judges and in his
commitment of expert loyalty.
In practice, the Court omits the formality that the technicians accept
the position like a procedural act prior to surrendering their expert
testimony. This is the consequence of not being appointed, it is only under
these circumstances that the interested party offers the expert and the
technician, the Court summons him and he appears at the public hearing,
where he is sworn and renders an opinion.
The acceptance of the position is an essential formality for the expert
testimony along with the oath, for when the expert is under oath he is
committed to present the opinion and to complete his tasks faithfully and
strictly to his technical knowledge. Furthermore, the expert will have the
obligation of presenting the report in writing, as well as to appear before
the public hearing if required by the Tribunal to make any explanation or
clarifications to his testimony which may even be done in writing, thus
reinforcing the principle of community of the proof.'
24. It arises from the concept that the expert evidence together with the testimonial and
documentary proof, are the fundamental evidence of the whole process and consequently, it is
necessary that appropriate and precise regulations exists regarding their practice. The principle of
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In accordance with the practice followed by the ICHR, the expert
offered by the proposing party and properly summoned by the Court to
appear at the public hearing does not always appear. The expert's failure
to appear can be avoided by requiring previous acceptance. The Court has
the power to propose sanctions by means of its internal legislation.
However, when there is no acceptance, the expert can avoid these
sanctions because he did not sign an acceptance and was not sworn.
The practice of having experts render live testimony appears to have
used the oath as part of the expert's acceptance of the position before the
Court. The oath found in article 37 of the Rules of Procedure states that "I
swear or I solemnly declare that I will discharge my duty as an expert
witness honorably and conscientiously."' This oath or declaration set
forth in article 37 of the Rules of Procedure has to be completed before the
Court, the President or other judges that act for on its behalf. Regulating
the oath in this manner, we find that it has promising character since it is
taken before the expert testimony is presented. So the assertive oath is not
permitted after the opinion, affirming having said the truth, since the
formula "I will discharge my duty as an expert" is stated in the future
tense.'
It is necessary to make the distinction in the practice of the Court,
between the act of the acceptance and that of the oath. Although they can
be carried out in one act, they are not the same thing. The doctrine is
unanimous in considering that the purpose of the oath is to give "a
guarantee of the conscientious severity of its tests and of the sincerity of his
science and to set forth all the means to respond reasonably and positively
to the questions that have been asked."' This is the true commitment of
expert fidelity.' In contrast, the acceptance is a commitment in expert
matters that binds the acceptor to the Tribunal in such a way that the failure
to fulfill the obligations makes the expert subject to sanctions that the Court
may set in accordance with article 51 of its Rules of Procedure, which
states that "[tihe Court will be able to request to the States that the State
apply the sanctions that its legislation sets forth against those who do not
the real or material truth requires the elemnents of proof brought to the process by the parties to be
common so that it will not be evidence which will only favor its presenter, but rather it is
incorporated to the process as a whole, for the investigation of the truth.
25. Rules, supra note 2, art. 37.
26. Id.
27. Mittermair, TRATADO DE LA PRUEBA EN MATERIAL CRIMINAL 154 (1929).
28. Nufiez, supra note 7, at 23. "The expert loyalty implies the duty to affirm the truth,
not to deny it, and neither to omit it in his report about the matters to deal with. The non-
fulfillment of this duty, besides subjecting the expert to disciplinary sanctions of administrative
nature (if an expert in official capacity) or professional nature, is punishable as a crime.. . " Id.
(Editorial Note: Translated from Spanish).
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appear or refuse to depose without legitimate reason or that, from the
Court's standpoint, have violated their oath."29
In the acceptance it is implicit the nonexistence of reasons for
recusation or inhibition that could prevent the expert from accepting the
position, or else the expert is not aware of any. Having knowledge of these
and omitting them in a deceitful manner would make the rendered expert
opinion null. The acceptance should always be given by the expert in
written form by means of a document directed to the ICHR and presented
in the terms set forth in article 26 of the Rules of Procedure, presented
personally, via courier, facsimile, telex, mail or any other method
generally used. Once the acceptance has taken place, the Court will
proceed to the ceremony of swearing in.
In regards to recusation and inhibitions, the doctrine and jurisprudence
of the Court agree to apply upon the experts the same rules regulating the
judges. This is because of their role as assistants to the judges, as set forth
in article 19.1 of the Statute.' ° Article 49.1 of the Rules of Procedures
provides this position stating that "[tihe reasons for the impediment for the
judges set forth in article 19.1 of the Statutes will be applicable to the
experts. 31
In the jurisprudence of the ICHR, there have only been a few cases
where recusation and inhibitions were invoked. We find no precedence
where recusation has been accepted and the technician been separated.
When rejecting the recusation, the Court has always presented its
declarations reserving itself the right to reevaluate them at later time.32
The jurisprudence and practice of the Court are evidence that the
Court and the parties have made great use of the expert testimony.
Particularly, it has played an important role in cases of damages to
determine the material damages and the moral damages. Inside the sui
generis practice of the expert testimony before the Court, the presentation
of written report in certain cases33 has been used, especially when the
ICHR has ordered it. Nevertheless, the custom is the oral presentation
rendered in a public hearing.
In reparation matters, the Court in the El Amparo case, considered
pertinent the use of the professional services of an expert to determine the
29. The Rules, supra note 2, art. 51.
30. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING
TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 27, OEA/Ser. LIV/11.50, Doc. 6 (1980),
reprinted in 19 ILM 635 (1980) art. 49.1 [hereinafter the Statute].
31. The Rules, supra note 2, art. 49.1.
32. Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, (Reparations) Judgment of September 10, 1993, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 15 (1993), paras. 32, 35, and 37
33. Fair6n Garbi, (Ser. C) No. 6, para. 55.
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amounts to reimburse.34 The Court according to its broad powers in
matters of proof appealed to the expert testimony. 35 The Court used a
mathematical expert who rendered his report in writing. It is also
important to point out that the Court while applying its broad powers of
valuation and using the rules of logic, based the compensation, indicating
the application and interpretation that it makes from the report and sets the
criteria for reparations based on said rules.
There are cases which are against the principle "iura novit curia.
For example, the judgment in the Loayza Tamayo case of September 17,
1997, it was considered that the experts report about doctrinal points of
importance, but that for the principle "iura novit curia," they were not
relevant, because they are common knowledge among jurists. Said expert
testimonies were offered by the interested party, and this prevents the
Court from exercising control of relevance and pertinence.
The Court in the Castillo Pez case, found the expert testimony
relevant and pertinent.37 Here one has an expert testimony helpful for the
investigation of the real or historical truth of the facts for a correct
administration of justice and true assistance to the tribunal, in this case, the
ICHR. The Court sometimes requires experts that point out the most
recent legislation and its application in the internal law of a State. In said
situations, there is no contradiction with the principle "Jura novit curia",
since the Court, as an international tribunal, requires knowledge of the law
to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties.38
In the jurisprudence of the Court, different areas of expertise may be
fouid. For example, in the Godinez Cruz case, an expert was used to
determine the presumed moral damage invoked by the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights. The Court found that the expert testimony
proved that the victim's immediate family suffered moral damages for
which they should be indemnified.39 This cite also proves the value that the
Court places upon the expert, as a form of evidence, to create its
34. El Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of September 14, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
(Ser. C) No. 28 (1996), para. 12 and 28. See also Neira Alegrfa v. Peru, Judgment of September
19, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 29 (1996), para. 34.
35. El Amparo, (Ser. C) No. 28, paras. 12 and 28.
36. Loayza Tamayo, (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 45(h)-(i).
37. Castillo Piez, (Ser. C) No. 4.
38. Paniagua Morales, (Ser. C) No.37, para. 67(i)(j)(k). See also Loayza Tamayo, (Ser.
C) No. 33, para. 450) and Suhrez Rosero v. Ecuador, Judgment of November 12, 1997 (Ser. C)
No. 35 (1997), paras. 23 (e) and 29, in this case the Court embraced the expert testimony fully
stating so in the valuation given to the evidence in their point 30: "[tjhe testimony of the witness,
Mrs. [C.A.] and the doctor [E.A.G.]'s expert testimony were not objected to by the State and,
therefore, the Court takes as proven the facts declared by the former, as well as the considerations
made by the expert on the Ecuadorian Law." (Editorial Note: Translated from Spanish).
39. Godfnez Cruz, (Ser. C) No. 8, paras. 49 and 50. See also Velisquez Rodrfguez,
Judgment of July 21, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 7 (1989), paras. 51 and 52.
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conviction on a specific case. There are precedents of expert testimony
ordered by the ICHR to better resolve cases.4
Similarly, an expert test was ordered in the Fairen Garbi and Solis
Corrales cases. In both cases, the expert testimony was useful for the Court
as means to determine the real facts. In the case of Fairdn Garbi and Solis
Corrales the testimonies served as part of the foundation of the Court to
prove that the State was not responsible for the disappearance of the
victims. 4 ' In the Gangaram Panday case, the expert testimony together with
other evidence gave indications to discard the possibility that the victim had
been tortured.42
Finally, article 50 of the Rules of Procedure regulates the protection
of the experts that have submitted their opinions before the Court, which
states that "[s]tates may neither institute proceedings against witnesses or
expert witnesses nor bring illicit pressure to bear on them or on their
families on account of declarations or opinions they have delivered before
the Court." 43 The existence of this protection is important because of the
nature of the matters that the Court deals with. The experts render reports
on matters of political or social transcendency for diverse sectors of
society. Thus, the safety of the experts and their relatives will only be
guaranteed by the above-mentioned protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is considered that in view that the Court, for over eighteen years, in
the cases for its consideration, have examined numerous expert tests
rendered in diverse fields. Therefore, it is necessary to establish, based in
the jurisprudence of the Tribunal and the doctrine, the pertaining rules as
regards expert testimony to strengthen the rights to a defense and due
process.
Moreover, the expert is a method of proof that has acquired great
importance, due to the success that the diverse arts, sciences and
techniques have had in this century. This success has allowed the same to
develop as auxiliary of the judges for the administration of justice.
The Inter-American Court as an international tribunal counts with
more flexible parameters for the employment and valuation of the proof, by
virtue of its nature and matter. The American Convention on Human
Rights, the Statute, and the Rules of Procedure of the Court do not contain
precise norms that regulate its use. By virtue of the above-mentioned, the
Court, through its jurisprudence has determined the approaches as regards
to admissibility, realization and valuation of proof, which was cleverly
40. Gangaram Panday, Judgment of January 21, 1994, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C), No.
16 (1994), para. 30. See also Fair6n Garbi, (Ser. C) No. 6, para. 38.
41. Fair6n Garbi, (Ser. C) No. 6, para. 156.
42. Gangaram Panday, (Ser. C) No. 16, para. 56.
43. Rules of Procedure, supra note 2, art. 50.
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made according to the principles of the freedom of proof and the rules of
logic.
It is considered convenient that certain changes be introduced in the
practice of the expert testimony, so that the Tribunal is responsible for
appointing the experts. Also, it is necessary to regulate the formal act of
acceptance of the position, differentiating it from the oath to guarantee the
rendition of the expert opinion and that otherwise, article 51 of the Court's
Rules of Procedure may be applied. The technical nature of the expert
testimony should be regulated so that the opinion is presented in writing,
with the obligation of providing explanations or clarifications and the
commitment to appear at a public hearing if necessary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
International tribunals in general have within their competence to end
conflicts presented by individuals with legal capacity through the issuance
of judgments and opinions.'
In International Law, judgments seek to establish the responsibility of
those subject to International Law for committing an illegal act. In the case
of the international human rights law, judgments seek to establish the
responsibility of the States for violations of human rights provided in the
* Adjunt Secretary of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Professor of Human
Rights Law, Universidad de La Salle, San Jos6, Costa Rica. The opinions in this article are the
sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights or its Secretariat.
1. American Convention of Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 ILM 673, OEA/Ser.
K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 1 (1970) art. 66 [hereinafter The American Convention].
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corresponding international convention.2 It means that in human rights
matters, there should always be an individual whose rights have been
violated even when, in some cases, the individual is unable to appear
before the Court directly.3
If an international tribunal determines that there has been international
responsibility, that judgment may establish the proper compensations to be
awarded to the injured party.4 It may also technically punish and abstain
from determining compensations until later in the legal process. Such has
been the Fpractice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in most of
its cases. Such compensation is "[an effective system for the protection
of the human rights which allows judgments to be more than mere moral
punishment. "6
It is through their jurisprudence that the tribunals forge their
development and it is their judicial effectiveness that allows a tribunal to
achieve prestige and credibility. Hence, since the judgments of the Inter-
American Court are not final and not subject to appeals, 7 its jurisprudence
must be objective and sufficiently clear so that its decisions are respected
by the States Party to the American Convention on Human Rights
(Convention or American Convention). Specifically, the judgments on
reparations test the State's compliance with international obligations.8
2. Id. at art. 63.1; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953 as amended by Protocols No. 3, 5, and 8 which
entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 1971, and Jan. 1, 1971, respectively, art. 50.
3. In accordance with article 61 of the American Convention, only the State Parties to
the Convention or the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights may submit a case for the
consideration of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Unlike the European system, where
individuals are allowed to go directly to the European Court of Human Rights as provided in
article 3 of Protocol No. 9 of November 6, 1990.
4. Gangaram Panday v. Suriname, Judgment of January 21, 1994, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R.
(Ser. C) No. 16 (1994).
5. See Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter. Am. Ct.
H.R., (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988); Godfnez Cruz v. Honduras, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 5 (1989); Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment of December 4,
1991, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R., (Ser. C) No. 11 (1994); Garrido v. Argentina, Judgment of February
2, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. HR., (Ser. C) No. 26 (1996); El Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of
January 18, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 19 (1995); Neira Alegrfa et al. v. Peru,
Judgment of January 19, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No 20 (1995).
6. Nieto Navia, Rafael, La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Su
Jurisprudencia como Mecanismo de Avance en la Proteccidn y sus Lrmites 14 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
1991).
7. American Convention, supra nota 1, art 67.
8. Velisquez Rodrfguez v. Honduras (Compensatory Damages), Judgment of July 21,
1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 7 (1989); Godfnez Cruz v. Honduras (Compensatory
Damages), Judgment of July 21, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 8 (1990); Velisquez
Rodriguez v. Honduras (Interpretation of Compensatory Damages), Judgment of August 17, 1990,
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATES FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
The responsibility provisions found in regional instruments for the
protection of human rights are scarce because they only define the content
and extent of the violations of the established obligations. Generally, they
refer to the principles and rules regarding the responsibility of the State
which dictate the custom or action that created the arbitrary tribunals or the
International Court of Justice of The Hague.' On the other hand, this
theory of international responsibility is established on the basis developed
in internal law, hence such principles and rules have a civilistic
connotation. The existing difficulty to construe a uniformed theory of
international responsibility and even more an international codification
should be added. 10
Even with those limitations, the international responsibility has been
developed on the basis that it is inferred, as a principle of international law;
that any violation of an international obligation implies that of a reparation
in an adequate form. "
The Inter-American System for Protection of Human Rights provided
in the American Convention, embraces that fundamental principle of
international law in article 63.1 which provides that:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or
freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that
the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom
that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the
consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 2 (1990); Godfnez Cruz v. Honduras (Interpretation of
Compensatory Damages), Judgment of August 17, 1990, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 9
(1990); Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname (Reparations), Judgment of September 10, 1993, Inter.
Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15 (1994); Gangaram Panday v. Suriname, Judgment of January 21,
1994, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 16 (1994); Garrido, (Ser. C) No. 26; El Amparo v.
Venezuela (Reparations), Judgment September 14, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28
(1996); Neira Alegrfa et al. v.Peru (Reparations), Judgment of September 19, 1996, Inter-Am.
Ct. H. R. (Ser. C) No. 29 (1996).
9. See Aguiar Aranguren, Asdrbal, Responsibilidad Internacional del Fstado por
Violaci6n de Derechos Humanos, (Impressions on the Pact of San Jos6). Separata de la Revista de
Derecho Pdblico, No. 53-54 (Ed. Jurldica Venezolana 1993).
10. See Garcia-Amador, F.V., Principios de Derecho Internaaonal que rigen Ia
responsabilidad: Andlisis Crtico de La Concepcidn Tradicional (Madrid, Escuela de Funcionario
Internacionales 1963).
11. C. Usine de Chorzow, Comp6tence, arret No. 13, 1928, C.P.J.I., (Ser. A) No. 17,
at 29; Aloeboetoe et al., (Ser. C) No. 11, para. 43.
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breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair
compensation be paid to the injured party. 12
That international law obligation governs all aspects of the reparations
such as its scope, method, and benefits. As for its scope, article 63.1
distinguishes between the behavior that a State responsible for a violation
should observe from the time that judgment is entered and the
consequences of that State's attitude during the violation. As to the future,
it seeks to ensure the injured party the enjoyment of the right or freedom
violated, and otherwise it empowers the Court to impose reparations.13
Such reparation, insofar as is possible, consists of the full restitution
(restitutio in integrum), which consist of the restoration of the prior
situation and the reparation of the consequences of the- violation.
14
Nevertheless, that is not the only way to repair an international illegal act
since there may be cases in which restitutio in integrum is inapplicable or is
insufficient or inadequate.15
Now then, the responsibility in human rights matters is imputed to the
State first; and eventually, to the individuals, insurgent groups or liberation
movements in connection with violations of the Humanitarian International
Law. Additionally, that international responsibility arises, not only from
an internationally illegal act, but rather it should represent a violation of a
human right protected under an international instrument or in customary
international law,' 6 particularly, if it is jus cogens.'"
The obligation of the State to respect human rights implies an
obligation to not act. Nevertheless, it also implies the duty of guaranteeing
those rights, which results in an obligation to act. For example, in the
cases of Veldsquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz, the Inter-American Court
affirmed, in connection with article 1.1 of the American Convention, that
the obligation to "ensure" implies the right of the States Party to organize
12. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 63.1.
13. Aloeboetoe et al. (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 46.
14. Velisquez Rodrfguez (Compensatory Damages) (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 26.
15. Usine de Ch6zow, supra note 11, at 48.
16. Van Boven, Theo, INFORME DEFnmvo PRESENTADO A LA SUBCOMISi6N DE
PREvENCI6N DE DISCRIMINACIONES Y PROTECCI6N A LAS MINORL4S DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS.
E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1993/8 at 18; citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS (1987)
(provides that a State violates an international human rights if, as a State political issue, it
practices, encourages or tolerates a) genocide; b) slavery or the trade of slaves; c) murder or be
the cause for the disappearance of persons; d) torture or other punishments or cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment; e) the prolonged detention; f) the systematic racial discrimination; or g) a
systematic regime of fragrant violations of internationally recognized human rights.
17. Id.
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their public protection systems so that they are capable of judicially
ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights."
The international responsibility for the violations of human rights
responds, in any event, to that imputed to the State for acts by its agents
and in exercising its functions. That for which the objective theory of
responsibility operates, which does not take into account exemptions from
responsibility in deceit function or negligence in the agent's behavior, an
aspect reserved to the subjective responsibility as an internal law issue. In
such manner that if an agent acts in said manner, the State is always
responsible for having elected or chosen the officer or agent that acted
negligently (culpa in eligendo) or the State failed to supervise the acts of its
agents (culpa in vigilndo).
For all intents and purposes, it is irrelevant to assess the individual
fault of the those committing the international illegal act since the agent
may not be individualized or identified. The State would only be exempt
from responsibility if it did not support or tolerate the transgression.
Otherwise, that even if this occurred despite having acted in a preventive
manner, it made every effort to ensure that the illegal act would not go
unpunished. 1
9
However, the objective responsibility of the State can go beyond the
acts of its agents. It is possible that the State apparatus act in such a way
that allows the violation to go unpunished; or that the victim's rights not be
recovered if it has tolerated that individuals or groups act free or
unpunished in detriment to the human rights recognized in the
Convention.'
III. THE VICTIM'S RIGHT TO REPARATIONS
In regards to human rights protection, the individual, and sometimes
a group,2' have the right to obtain reparations for human rights violations.
It is important to highlight as a specific note to international human
rights law, that the right to be repaired substantially modifies the notion of
traditional international law. In this case, the State that commits the illegal
act is responsible to the injured State at an interstate level and not before
the individual or group of persons that suffered the damages, who are
18. Velisquez Rodrfguez (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 166 and 175; Godfnez Cruz (Ser. C) No.
6, para. 166, 175.
19. See Velfiquez Rodrfguez (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 183.
20. Id. para. 187.
21. Specially, when it involves flagrant human rights violations as victims of genocide,
detentions and general executions, and others which may consist of a group of minimal
humanitarian norms as for example, those indicated in article 75 of Protocolo I of the Convention
of Geneva, on August 12, 1949 and the Declaration of Minimal Humanitarian Norms aproved in
Turku by a group of experts on December 2, 1990 reprinted in E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1991/55.
1999
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 5:583
unable to make an international claim.' Hence, in international human
rights law, the State from which the victim is a national, does not have an
inherent right to receive reparations since it does not function as a
diplomatic protection.
The Inter-American Court has recognized reparations for individuals
as an injured party or in its default, to the victim's relatives. In one
occasion, it was attempted to obtain reparation for a group in a case where
the demanded State admitted its responsibility for the facts articulated in the
demand.' Specifically, the Inter-American Commission requested that a
tribe be indemnified because it found that the tribe had suffered direct
moral damages,' but the Court found that in practice, "[tihe obligation to
pay moral compensation does not extend to such communities, nor to the
State in which the victim participated... If in some exceptional case such
compensation has ever been granted, it would have been to a community
that suffered direct damages."'
The theory of the Court, even when it does not grant repair to a group
for indirect moral damages, does not necessarily end the possibility of
repairing if it is demonstrated that, indeed, a direct moral damages is
produced, since the rationale for not repairing the tribe was that the
Commission failed to present evidence to prove a "racial motive" and an
assumed autonomy of the tribe.' It is necessary to wait until a situation
arises where the violation of human rights is of such magnitude that it
could be demonstrated that a group suffered direct moral damages. In such
case, the Inter-American Court would have to interpret if the word
"injured" of article 63.1 of the Convention, could cover not only the
-individual as "injured parties," but also a group, hence it would recognize
its international subjectivity.
In my opinion, that extensive interpretation is not proper in cases
dealing with civil and political rights violations. However, in situations
where economic, social and cultural rights are violated, it is evident that
the passive subject of the violation is the group. Thus, it is not strange to
find that there is a possibility that not too long from now there would be the
opportunity to present to the Inter-American Court a case with these
22. Rodley, Nigel, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 97
(1987).
23. Aloeboetoe et al. (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 11.
24. In that case it was alleged that "[i]n the traditional Maroon society, a person is not
only a member of his own family group, but also a member of the village community and of the
tribal group. In this case, the damages suffered by the villagers due to the loss of certain
members of its group must be redressed. Since the villagers, in practice, constitute a family in the
broad sense of that term . . . they have suffered direct emotional damages as a result of the
violations of the Convention." Id. para. 19.
25. Id. para. 83.
26. Id. para. 84.
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characteristics, in view of the requirements of the Protocol in Addition to
the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights.27 Said protocol establishes as mandatory a
wide range of economic, social, and cultural rights. However, in order to
become effective, it requires that at least eleven States ratify or adhere to
it. 28
In Aloeboetoe et al., the Court went further since it found that
although in the compensation for the heirs of the victims there is a fixed
sum for education of minors until they reach a certain age, those objectives
"[w]ill not be met merely by granting compensatory damages; it is also
essential that the children be offered a school where they can receive
adequate education and basic medical attention."29
That method of reparation covers more than the direct benefit to the
children of the victims. That is because in a certain form, an obligation
was established on the demanded State which protects the social rights, as
well as the right for an education and health, that undoubtedly, benefit an
entire community.
IV. Locus STANDI OF THE VICTIM IN THE REPARATION STAGE
Article 61 of the American Convention clearly establishes that "[o]nly
the States Party and the Commission shall have the right to submit a case to
the Court. 30 Accordingly, neither the victim nor the representatives are
parties in the contentious process before the Court, even when granted
some participation.3' Indeed, the representatives of the victim or their
relatives can act as assistants of the Commission's representative before the
Court. 2 Hence, the tribunal would hear its points of view in the event that
the plaintiff attempts to discontinue the claim33 or when the parties have
27. Protocol in Addition to the American Convention on Human rights in the area of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights "Protocol of San Salvador" (Nov. 17, 1988) (visited on
May 31, 1999) <http://www.oas.org/EN/PROG/JURIDICO/english/Treatiesa.52.html.
28. Id. at art. 21.3.
29. Aloeboetoe et al. (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 96. (establishing that
Suriname is obligated to reopen the school at Gujaba and staff it with teaching and administrative
personnel to enable it to function permanently as well as to reopen and make operation the existing
medical dispensary).
30. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 61.
31. Viviana Gallardo et al., Advisory Opinion (Piza Escalante, J.) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
(Ser. A) No. G 101/81 at 31.
32. RuLEs OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AM. Cr. H.R., ANNUAL REPORT (1991),
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.I/V./II.25 doc 7 at 18 (1992) reprinted in Basic Doc. Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American System OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6, rev. 1, at 145 (1992)
art. 22.2 [hereinafter Rules of Procedure].
33. Id. at art. 43.1.
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arrived at a friendly settlement.34 During the determination of reparations,
according to article 44.2 of the Rules of Procedure, the Court is authorized
to invite the victim's representatives or its relatives so that they can submit
briefs regarding the application of article 63.1 of the Convention.3 ' That
was the first attempt of the Inter-American system to allow the victim to
have certain procedural rights in the Inter-American Court.
The Court, knowing that the objective of the American Convention is
to protect individual's rights,36 introduced a fundamental change in the new
Rules of Procedure of the Court; which became effective on January 1,
1997, upon giving locus standi to the victim in the reparation stage.
Indeed, the Court has recognized its importance upon establishing that in
that stage the "[riepresentatives of the victims or of its relatives may
present their arguments and evidence independently."31
In essence, the Court will also be able to authorize its autonomous
participation in reparation hearings. The reason of being that manner is
that in the reparation stage, the victim or its representatives are the proper
person to present to the tribunal first hand evidence of expenses and other
facts which facilitate the determination of the extent and amount of the
compensation. Further, it is the beneficiary or the party directly affected
by the decision.
V. PROCEDURES TO DETERMINE REPARATIONS
The Inter-American Court has the ability to order reparations along
with the judgment on the merits. In essence, it can theoretically punish and
reserve its determination for a subsequent procedural stage. The Rules of
Procedure of the Court do not provide for a specific procedure to
determine reparations. The new Rules of Procedure only has an article
which provides that "[w]hen the judgment on the merits does not
specifically resolve the reparations, the Court will schedule that opportunity
for its later decision and it will determine the procedure."3"
Back to the process of reparations, the justification of this stage is
based upon obtaining sufficient evidentiary proof, including experts,
depending on the degree of difficulty of each case, the number of
beneficiaries, and the nature of the violations. The general procedural
practice39 has been to grant to the Parties, which include the Commission
and the State, a reasonable period of time to reach an agreement or friendly
34. Id. at art. 43.2.
35. Id. at art. 44.2.
36. Velasquez Rodriguez (Preliminary Exceptions) Judgment of June 26, 1987, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 1, para. 30 (1987).
37. Rules of Procedure, supra note 34, art. 23
38. Id. at art. 56.
39. Godfnez Cruz (Ser. C) No. 8 (the exception to this rule).
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settlement, which would be reviewed and confirmed by the Tribunal.' In
the event that an agreement or confirmation is not reached, the procedural
stage of reparations begins, for which the parties are offered a period of
time to present the briefs as to the extent, content, and amount of the
reparations.
As a procedural practice, the Inter-American Court holds public
hearings to allow the parties to present their proof and allegations about the
reparations and then issues an appropriate judgment. From there on, the
parties enter into another procedural stage known as supervision of the
execution of judgments, which consists on determining if the responsible
State has fulfilled its obligations in the manner and anticipated time. Only
the cases against Honduras have gone through this stage since the Court
issued resolutions and found Honduras in compliance with the judicial
orders and terminated the process. The parties had previously manifested
their consent to terminate the legal proceedings in those cases.
The actions carried out by the Court while exercising its duty to
supervise, depend on the nature of the issues resolved in the reparation
judgments. In some cases, as those involving Honduras, it should
determine the payment of a fixed amount of money as compensation to the
relatives of the victims and that trust funds be established in favor of minor
beneficiaries. In the case of Aloeboetoe et al., the work is more detailed
since in addition to supervising, it must also analyze the annual report
presented by the Aloeboetoe Foundation, created by the reparation
judgment; specifically, if the resolutions ordered, such as the reopening of
the School and the Medical Clinic in Gujaba continue in operation.
Perhaps the most delicate part in the system for the protection of
human rights is that referred to the reparations and its compliance because
of its intrinsic connection with the judicial effectiveness of the Court's
judgments.41 Consciously, and in order to prevent the Court's judgments
from being merely a moral sanction, the American Convention provided
"[t]hat part of a judgment that stipulates compensatory damages may be
executed in the country concerned in accordance with domestic procedure
governing the execution of judgments against the State... "42
This provision is not analogous to any provision found in the
European Convention on Human Rights, it allows for the compliance with
the reparation judgment. It is a "[c]ertain disposition, which can make
possible a form of enforcing judgments of the Inter-American Court, in the
event that the judgment stipulates for compensatory damages, effective,
fast, pursuant to the true and certain objective of the protection of human
40. Rules of Procedure, supra note 34, art. 56.2.
41. See RODRIGUEZ RESCIA, vfCTOR MANUEL, Eficacia Jurfdica de la
Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en La Cone y el Sistema
Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, NiETo NAVIA, RAFAEL, (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 1994).
42. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 68.2.
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rights. ""' Nevertheless, the true threatening force of the Court's judgments
should reside in the Member State's agreement in the Convention, to
comply with the Court's decisions as provided in article 68.1 of the
Convention. That "agreement", may not be used to lessen the coercive
force of the judgments since, on the contrary, States Party are obligated to
respect the rights and freedoms observed in the Convention according to its
article 1.1. In fact, the American Convention acquires an effectiveness of
the highest practical importance for acting as internal right of immediate
application by the organs of the States Party and for its application in the
international law framework.
This does not prevent article 68.1, which is similar to article 53 of the
European Agreement for the Protection of Human Rights, and that is
imperative for all the States Party, would be reinforced by internal
legislation because of their obligation to comply with article 2 of the
American Convention, to adopt internal rights provisions to guarantee the
exercise of the rights and freedoms not guaranteed under that legislation.
In other words, allow the judgments of the Inter-American Court to be
executory as well as mandatory.
A. Terminology for Forms of Reparation
The first thing that should be outlined when dealing with compensation
or reparations, is to establish the correct terminology and determine their
content and extent. The uniformed and sometimes erroneous use of the
terminology in international instruments providing for reparations is
evident. This way for example, article 63.1 of the American Convention
establishes that when it is established that a Member State has violated the
rights or freedom protected under said Convention, the Court would be
allowed to fix a "just compensation" to the injured party. The term
"compensation," in strict technical sense, represents only one form or
reparation, the latter being the correct generic term to refer to any means
of compensation, compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, or satisfaction,
which appears to be the meaning and extent of said provision.
The aforementioned implies that in applying correct legislative
techniques, the American Convention should have used the word "fair
reparation" as a broad term and not "compensation" which, although
includes compensation for material and moral damages, it excludes
restitution, rehabilitation, or satisfaction."
Perhaps, the terminology problems forced the Inter-American Court
to make a broad interpretation of the term "just compensation" in
establishing that "[tihe fair compensation describes as "compensatory" in
the judgment on the merits . . . includes reparation to the family of the
43. Ros Espiel, H-tor, La Convenci6n Americana y la Convencitn Europea de
Derechos Humanos, Anhlisis Comparativo 221 (Ed. Jurfdica de Chile 1991).
44. Van Boven, supra note 16, at 63.
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victim for the material and moral damages they suffered... " where it
compared the term "compensation" with that of "reparation" due to the
incorporation of the elements of reparation which are not proper in terms
of "compensation."
However, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court itself, in
subsequent judgments has used the terms "reparations" and
"compensation" indistinctly.' In an effort to have uniformity in the
terminology at an international level, it is worth noting the effort of Mr.
Theo Boven, Special Reporter for the United Nations47 in proposing a
project of principles and basic guidelines within the different forms of
reparation would be highlighted given its character. As part of it, it
includes restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and
guarantees against reoccurrence.
B. Determination and Extent of the Reparations
Determining a person's right to restitution, compensation or
rehabilitation results in one or more human rights violations. Such a
finding or confirmation is generally preceded by a judgment or opinion
from an international tribunal, although in some cases there are non-
jurisdictional organs and different competence that may issue resolutions or
reports with recommendations in that sense. In that manner, the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights, the European Commission of
Human Rights the Committee of human rights of the United Nations, the
Committee for the Elimination of the Racial Discrimination of the United
Nations, the Committee against the Torture of the United Nations, among
others.
On the other hand, there is a general erroneous belief in that the
reparations in human rights matters are based upon "flagrant violations" of
human rights. That is perhaps because many United Nations international
conventions on human rights have that characteristic. Nevertheless, some
international instruments such as the American Convention on Human
Rights, the European Agreement for the Protection of the Human Rights
and the Pact of Civil Rights and Political, provide the opportunity to repair
and compensate for violations that would not necessarily be considered
"flagrant. ,,48
Before the victim or relatives of the victim obtain some form of
reparation for a human rights violation, it is required that the illicit
45. Velisquez Rodrfguez (Compensatory Damages) (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 39.
46. Aloeboetoe et al. (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 12; Neria Alegrfa et al.
(Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 20, para. 5; El Amparo (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 19, para. 5.
47. Van Boven, supra note 16.
48. Those civil and political rights, which may not necessarily be considered human
rights of lower scale, do not represent violations of such seriousness as genecide, mass
discrimination, disappearances.
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behavior cease and if it is extended and they have the right to obtain
guarantee against reoccurrence.49 In general, the reparation can adopt the
form of restitutio in integrum, compensation and securities and guarantees
against reoccurrence. The following classification can be made. 5°
Restitutio in integrum is the re-establishment of the situation to what existed
before the international unlawful act. Compensation occurs when the
damages cannot be compensated by means of the restitution in integrum. It
covers any damages of economic value suffered by the injured party such
as physical or mental damages, psychological or physical pain or suffering,
opportunity cost; loss of wages and the capacity to earn a living; reasonable
medical and other expenses in rehabilitation, damages to goods and trade;
including loss earnings; damages to reputation or dignity and reasonable
expert fees.5
The satisfaction and the non-reoccurrence guarantees seek to obtain
particular satisfaction for moral damages and it can adopt the form of an
apology, in nominal damages. In the cases of flagrant violations, a
compensation for damages reflects the graveness of the violation; the
verification of the facts and the public revelation of the truth; a declaratory
judgment in favor of the victim; an excuse and acceptance of the
responsibility; the prosecution of people presumably responsible for the
violations; homages to the victims; and the prevention of a reoccurrence of
the violations.
The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court has made an important
development in the matter, continuing in certain form the previous sketch.
For example, it has had a noted concern for the obligation of the demanded
State in preventing and in essence, for restoring, which are closely linked.
Thus, it has stated that:
The State is in the juridical duty to prevent, reasonably, the
violations of the human rights, of investigating seriously with the
means within its reach the violations that have been made inside
the environment of its jurisdiction in order to identify to the
responsible ones, of imposing them the pertinent sanctions and of
assuring the victim an appropriate repair. 52
49. Van Boven, supra note 16 at 29.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Vellsquez Rodrguez (Compensatory Damages) (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 174; Cf. Juan
E. M6ndez and Jos6 Miguel Vivanco, Disappearances and the Inter-American Court: Reflections
on a Litigation Experience, in 13 HAMLINE L. REv. 507-577 (1990).
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VI. EXTENT AND CONTENT OF THE REPARATIONS IN THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Inter-American Court has had the opportunity to determine the
repairs through the interpretation and application of the article 63.1 of the
American Convention. Specifically, upon developing the concept of
paying a fair compensation to the victim's relatives and upon establishing a
consistent reparation in complete restitution (restitutio in integrum), which
defined, not only the re-establishment of the previous situation, but as the
possibility of repairing the consequences of the violation and the payment
of a fair compensation like compensation for the patrimonial and non-
patrimonial damages including emotional harm,53  with that which
incorporated elements characteristic of the compensation concepts,
rehabilitation and satisfaction.
Although the Court has not analyzed in detail the principles that
should guide the pecuniary compensations, it has established criteria and
guidelines. Thus, special damages and loss earnings should be appreciated
reasonably with reference to their liquidation; a criteria should be applied
of best benefit that the law of the responsible State offers their nationals
and that of the "indexacion" or conservation of the real value of the
stipulated amount when the payments should be made in quotas or long
terms.
54
In spite of the fact that the jurisprudence of the Court has established
that the reparation is compensatory and not punishing,55 it is true that, in
comparison with the jurisprudence of the European Court of the Human
Rights, it has not been very conservative, since it has focused more on the
recognition of representative satisfactions in a timid view of the concept of
"equal satisfactions" provided in article 50 of the Agreement of Rome.
In the cases against Honduras and Suriname, the Inter-American Court
established criteria to determine the reparations, following classic civilistic
limits, recaptured by the international arbitral jurisprudence. 7
In the most recent reparation judgments issued by the Tribunal,58 the
previous jurisprudential criteria was changed and the establishment of
reparations for patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages was adopted,
which follows the system applied by the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights.
53. Vellsquez Rodrfguez (Compensatory Damages) (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 26.
54. Velsquez Rodrfguez (Interpretation of the Judgment on Compensatory Damages)
(Ser. C) No. 2, para. 30.
55. Velisquez Rodrfguez (Compensatory Damages) (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 38.
56. See Piza Rocafort, Rodolfo, RESPONSABILIDAD DEL ESTADO Y DERECHOS
HUMANOS 210 (San Josh, Universidad de Centroam6rica 1988).
57. Aloeboetoe et al., (Ser. C) No. 11, para. 50.
58. El Amparo (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 19; Neira Alegrfa et al. (Reparations) (Ser. C)
No. 20.
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Nevertheless, for practical effects, we will analyze the jurisprudence
of the Inter-American Court under the criteria of loss wages, special
damages, and moral damages under the understanding that are a general
approach of the right applicable to international law.59
VII. MATERIAL DAMAGES
A. Loss Earnings
As for the compensation for loss earnings, it has been understood that
it equals the sum of the victim's income or that which his successors would
receive for the labor life if a human rights violations would not have
occurred. 60
The basis to calculate the loss earnings varies and depends on the
circumstances of each case. In Veldsquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz,
the basis for calculating the liquidation was the earned income of the
victims at the time of their disappearance projected until the time for
mandatory retirement as provided by internal law. On the contrary, in the
cases of Aloeboetoe et al., Neira Alegria et al., and El Amparo, since the
victims did not depend on a fixed salary, the minimum salary or the value
of the "canasta bfisica alimentaria" were used as basis for calculating the
amount." The interests accrued from the time of the action and until the
judgment was entered were added to the projected sum.62
In order to calculate the victim's projected future income, the life
expectancy of the corresponding country was taken into account.' A new
element introduced to the most recent jurisprudence,' was to subtract
twenty-five percent to the total sum of the projected income.
B. Special Damages
They are generally understood as the expenses incurred by the victims
or their relatives as a result of their efforts to investigate and sanction the
59. The international arbitrary jurisprudence considers that the material prejudices
include special damages as well as loss earnings and in addition establish that the compensation
should include the moral damages suffered by the victims. Aloeboetoe et al. (Reparations) (Ser.
C) No. 15, para. 50.
60. Id. para. 88.
61. Vel~luez Rodrfguez (Compensatory Damages) (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 46; Godfnez
Cruz (Compensatory Damages) (Ser. C) No. 8, para. 44; Aloeboetoe et al. (Reparations) (Ser. C)
No. 15, para. 88; Neira Alegrfa et al. (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 20, para. 50; y El Amparo
(Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 19, para. 28.
62. Neira Alegrfa et al (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 20, para. 50.
63. Id. See El Amparo (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 19, para 28.
64. Id.
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actions that violated the victims rights.6 In essence, all expenses should be
demonstrated with proper evidence and would be returned to the person
that incurred such expenses. Even when there is insufficient proof, the
Court has made compensatory estimates for expenses incurred in different
actions in the country appealing to principles of equity. '
The return of the costs as part of incurred expenses has been a
conflicting matter. First, because in some cases it was not considered
reasonable to pronounce judgment for having requested compensatory costs
in the process.67 Subsequently, because it has been reiterated that the
procedure of the case before the Inter-American Court operates by means
of a system of protection of the human rights instituted in such a way that
the Commission and the Inter-American Court finance their expenses
within the budget of the Organization of American States." As to the first
aspect, the reformation to the Rules of the Procedure, allows that even
when the demanding party does not request compensation, it may at
anytime.
With respect to the costs before the Court, the fact that the individual
has locus standi in the stage of reparations and can act as an individual
party since the Rules of Procedure became applicable, it seems to change
the panorama with regards to the costs in that the individual incurs in the
protection of his rights since is not forced to litigate under the aegis of the
Commission in that stage and it can opt to contract private professional
services.7'
As for the return of expenses to the victim for the process before the
Commission, it appears to represent a problem since in that phase, it is the
individual who should incur direct expenses before the organ. If the
circumstances in the case allow for a non-governmental organization to
represent it before the Commission, and if those expenses are not
recognized by the Court, it may be reducing the individual to take action
before the Inter-American human rights protection, because it is not
necessarily an non-governmental organization may be interested to take the
case, or its budget would not allow it. On the other hand, if the individual
does not want an non-governmental organization to handle his case before
the Commission, it would seem necessary to ask the question of whether
the Court would recognize returning the expenses for contracting
independent professional services.
65. Velsquez Rodrfguez (Compensatory Damages) (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 41.
66. El Amparo, (Ser. C) No. 19, para. 21.
67. Velfsquez Rodrfguez, (Ser. C) No. 4. para. 193.
68. Aloeboetoe et al. (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 113.
69. Rules of Procedure, supra note 32, art. 44.1.
70. Id. at art. 23.
1999 597
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 5:583
VIII. NON PATRIMONIAL DAMAGES
A. Moral Damages
Within this category of damages, is included in particular,
compensation for moral damages by means of different forms of
satisfaction. Moral damages with regards to human rights is perhaps the
damage that is most justly recouped. That is because it is evidenced and
human nature that all persons subjected to aggressions and taunt in
violation of their human rights experience moral damages. The Court has
clearly indicated that no evidence is necessary to arrive at that conclusion if
the responsibility of the State is demonstrated, or if the State expressly
acknowledges its responsibility.7'
Determining moral damages is generally approached by international
tribunals in a casuistic manner. Thus, resulting in the establishment of
general principles or normative rules in this field. However, some
guidelines in determining moral damages and the way to recoup them can
be found in the Court's decisions. For example, in the cases Veldsquez
Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz, the Inter-American Court embraced the issue
of compensation for moral damages in response to the Inter-American
Commission's request that the Government be ordered to pay a sum of
money to the successors of the victims in reparation of the special
damages, loss earnings, and moral damages. To prove the latter, it
presented psychiatric experts that the Court found sufficiently established
the existence of moral damages.'
It is necessary to add that the burden of proof to show moral damages
can shift in some cases. In the aforementioned cases against Honduras, the
Court established that "[tihe Government was unable to deny the existence
of the psychological problems that affected the relatives of the victim."73
When it is to the victim directly or the victim's successors who should
be compensated for moral damages, there is no doubt that evidence of
damages exist. The issue is different when the successors of the victim are
not the ones that should be compensated, but instead dependents not named
successors. In that case, it is necessary to prove moral damages, but in the
case of parents, there is a presumption that the parents have morally
suffered the cruel death of their sons and daughters, since "[i]t is
essentially human for all persons to feel pain at the torment of their
child. "74
That presumption is stronger when the psychic effects suffered by the
victim's relatives are the result of a forced disappearance of people, which
71. Aloeboetoe et al. (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 52.
72. Id.
73. Velquez Rodriguez (Compensatory Damages) (Ser. C) No. 7.
74. Aloeboetoe et al. (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 15, pan. 76-77.
598
Rescia
is surrounded of dramatic circumstances, and of an uncertainty which is
difficult to vanish.75 The Court found that the form of liquidation of the
compensation for moral damages must conform to principles of equity'
and in all cases it has translated it to a monetary amount, but that does not
mean that the Court has discretion to award them." For example, the
results of the psychiatric evaluations would be important technical elements
to consider.
Nevertheless, that has not been the only form of compensation of
moral damages. There are many cases in which other international
tribunals have agreed that the compensatory judgments per se, constitutes
sufficient compensation of moral damages, especially the European Court
of Human Rights.7 But since the human rights violations in the cases
solved by the Inter-American Court are serious because it involves the right
to live which represents a stronger moral suffering, it was found that a
compensatory judgment is insufficient in itself, thus additional monetary
compensation is allowed according to the principles of equity.
The European Court has established other forms of reparation for
moral damages including restitution. For example, in the case Brigandi,
the Government manifested having repaired the violation upon reinstating
to the petitioner a property to which his rights had been denied. 9
B. Non Patrimonial Satisfaction
In the cases against Honduras, the Commission requested ordering the
government to take some measures, such as the investigation of facts
related to the involuntary disappearance of the victims, the punishment of
those responsible, the public statements condemning the practice, and the
revindication of the victim and others.' The Court affirmed that such
measures would become part of the reparation of the consequences of the
infringement upon the rights or freedoms and not of the compensation.8'
Nevertheless, it found that the indication in the judgment on the merits on
the duty to investigate and prevent, are the duty of the responsible State
until fully carried out.'
Even though the Court did not consent or refer to other requests for
satisfaction, it did find that the compensatory judgment, constitutes in
75. See Veliluez Rodrfguez (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 50.
76. Id. para. 27.
77. Aloeboetoe et al. (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 87.
78. Arret Kruslin de 24 avril 1990, (Ser. A) No. 176-A, at 24, para. 39.
79. Eur. Ct. H.R., arret Brigandi du 19 f6vrier 1991, (Mcr. A) No. 194-B, at 3-2, para.
34.
80. Velisuez Rodrfguez, (Ser. C) No. 7. para. 32.
81. Id. para. 33.
82. Id. para. 43, 35.
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itself, a form of reparation and moral satisfaction of significance and
importance for the relatives of the victims.83 In the case Aloeboetoe et al.,
the Court found that the public acknowledgment of the responsibility by
means of the Court's judgment "[i]s a significant and important form of
reparation and moral satisfaction for the families of the victims and the
Samaraca tribe. "4
The victim is the first person with the right to receive reparation for
moral damages.m However, in cases of human rights violations as serious
as the disappearance, it is possible that the right to be compensated be
transferred to their heirs by succession. s6 And to demonstrate that
character, it is sufficient to show the family relationship without being
"required to follow the internal procedures of inheritance law.""
IX. CONCLUSION
In matters of reparations, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Court has been able to define parameters that facilitate its determination
and bases for the calculation of the same. This way for example, there is
uniformity within the patrimonial damages in the way of estimating it from
the guidelines taken in the first cases, but mainly, in the cases El Amparo
and Neira Alegrfa et al. With reference to moral damages, there has been
a constant jurisprudence about its justification and to the determination of
the beneficiaries. What has not been easy, is finding a formula for their
calculation that could be applied to all the cases, due to the particularities
of each matter and the type of violation. In any event, to calculate the
moral damages, it is not advisable to follow the civilistic approaches used
in some internal legislation that take as parameter a proportion of the
patrimonial damages to calculate the moral damages, since the
compensation for moral damages would be larger or smaller according to
the victim's income, which does not seem to be a just approach to
determine them.
As for other measures of satisfaction, the Court has been reluctant to
consider them and has limited itself to issue judgments, as well as the
reparation judgment itself, as appropriate forms of compensation. Lastly,
as regards costs, we should await the Court's decision when it is presented
with the first cases where the individual has autonomous procedural
participation in the stage of reparations. Nevertheless, it will also be
decisive what it decides when funds for the expenses of cases are presented
83. Id. at para. 36.
84. Aloeboetoe et al., (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 31.
85. Aloeboetoe et al., (Reparations) (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 52 (indicating that it was
clear that the victims suffered moral damages for it is characteristic of human nature that anybody
subjected to the aggression and abuse described... will experience moral suffering.
86. Id. at para. 54.
87. Velisquez Rodriguez, (Compensatory Damages) (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 54.
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before the Commission where patronage of some non-governmental
organization does not exist. The victim's continued direct actions the Inter-
American system for the protection of human rights and the American
Convention fulfills its goals and objectives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When analyzing the contentious jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights ("the Court" or "Inter-American Court"), it is
necessary to emphasize the fact that, during its first seventeen years of
work, the Court has ruled on the merits of nine cases presented for its
consideration.' In three cases, the demanded States have accepted the
claims formulated by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
("the Commission").' In another case, the Court admitted the
* Secretary of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
1. Velsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 4 (1988); Fair6n Garbi v. Honduras, Judgment of March 15, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 6 (1989); Godfnez Cruz v. Honduras, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 6 (1989); Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment of December 4,
1991, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 11 (1994); Gangaram Panday v. Suriname, Judgment of
January 21, 1994, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 16 (1994); Neira Alegrfa v. Peri, Judgment
of January 19, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 20 (1995); Caballero Delgado v.
Colombia, Judgment of December 8, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 22 (1995); El
Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of January 18, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 19
(1995); Garrido v. Argentina, Judgment of February 2, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.
26(1996).
2. Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Judgment of December 4, 1991, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 11 (1994); El Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of January 18, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
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discontinuance of the action presented by the Commission.' It should also
be pointed out that in one of the nine cases, the Court released the
demanded State from all responsibility.4 In one case, the Court accepted
three of the preliminary exceptions interposed and in another, the Court
did not accept the interposed petition and remitted it to the Commission for
its consideration.6
When analyzing the aforementioned information, it is important to
note that in five cases in which the Court has entered judgment on the
merits and found a State responsible for violating the American Convention
on Human Rights ("the Convention"),7 the processes have concluded in an
unusual manner. That is, as consequence of "[t]he situation or the
procedural act, either unilateral or bilateral, voluntary or mandatory, which
interrupts the normal development of the process. " ' To wit, the Cayara
Case9 concluded during the preliminary exceptions stage. Maqueda Case °
concluded because of the discontinuance presented by the Commission and
in the cases Aloeboetoe et al Case," El Amparo Case2 and Garrido and
Baigorria Case, 3 the States recognized their international responsibility for
the events that gave rise to the demand. In other words, there have been
five cases in which the process has not normally developed until its
completion.
(Ser. C) No. 19 (1995); Garrido v. Argentina, Judgment of February 2, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 26 (1996).
3. Maqueda v. Argentina, Judgment of January 17, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 18 (1995).
4. Fair6n Garbi v. Honduras, Judgment of March 15, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 6 (1989).
5. Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of February 3, 1993, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No.14 (1994).
6. Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. G 101/81
(1984).
7. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 ILM 673, OEA/Ser.
K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 1, (1970) [hereinafter The Convention].
8. Luis Alvarez Julil et al., MANUAL DE DERECHO PROCESAL 299 (Editorial Astrea
1992).
9. Cayara v. Perd, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of February 3, 1993, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 14 (1994).
10. Maqueda v. Argentina, Resolution of January 17, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 18 (1995).
11. Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Judgment of December 4, 1991, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 11 (1994).
12. El Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of January 18, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 19 (1995).
13. Garrido v. Argentina, Judgment of February 2, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 26 (1996).
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There are four cases that are important to analyze because the process
has finished in an unusual manner because of the discontinuance in one
case and the acceptance of the claim in three other cases.. Consequently, it
is convenient to analyze the procedural forms of discontinuance and
acceptance of a claim. Subsequently, it is necessary to analyze their
regulation in the Rules of the Court and in the European Court of Human
Rights, the two regional international courts currently existing regarding
human rights, as well as in the Rules of the International Court of Justice.
Finally, it is important to analyze its application in the inter-American
system of protection of human rights by the Court in the four cases
previously mentioned.
A. Discontinuance 14
The discontinuance is an unusual manner of completing the process,
by means of a procedural act of a dispositive nature, without entering a
judgment on the merits. To such end, one abdicates the right to act or the
right is waived in the course of the process, creating a form similar to that
of the renouncement, a means to extinguish obligations. That is to say, the
discontinuance can be of two classes: action and of right. In the first case,
the renouncement does not prevent the matter in question from being
outlined in a subsequent action. In the second case, giving up the right
upon which the action is founded terminates the proceedings. In any event,
the discontinuance is always a unilateral act on the part of the plaintiff.
B. Acceptance of a Claim5
The procedural form of acceptance of a claim takes place when the
demanded party subjects itself to the substantial causes of action formulated
in the claim. Acceptance may be made at any time during the process, but
before a judgment on the merits is entered, since it implies the subjection
the petitioner's demands. It may be effective, if it is accompanied by the
fulfilling obligation. It may be expressed or implicit and may also be total
or partial, if it covers some or all of the petitioner's pretenses. In any
event, it implies the renouncement to the right to a defense.
14. Alvarez Julif et al., supra note 8, at 300-01; 2 MARIo ALBERTO FORNACIARI,
MoDOs ANORMALES DE TERMINACION DEL PROCESO 111 (Editorial DePalma 1988); Josh Ovalle
Favela, DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 191 (Editorial Harla 1994); 2 JUAN MONTERO AROCA ET
AL., DERECHO JURIDICIONAL 349 (Editorial Josh Maria Bosch 1994); 2 Aldo Bacre, TEORIA
GENERAL DEL PROcESO 557 (Editorial Abeledo-Perrot 1991); 1 ENCICLOPEDIA JURfDICA BASICA
2438 (Editorial Civitas 1995) 2 NuEvAs ENCICLOPEDIA JURIDICA 282 (Editorial Seix, 1950).
15. Alvarez Julii et al., supra note 8, at 300, 302; Alberto Fornaciari, supra note 14, at
112; OVALLE FAVELA, supra note 14, at 191; Montero Aroca et al, supra note 14, at 331; 1
Eduardo J. Couture, ESTUDIO DE DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 357 (Editorial DePalma 1979);
Bacre, supra note 14, at 406; ENCICLOPEDIA JURIDICA BASICA, supra note 14, at 434; NUEvAS
ENCICLOPEDIA JU RDICA, supra note 14, at 615.
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C. Rules of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights'6
Article 52.1 of the Rules of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights regulates the form of discontinuance. This article states as follows:
When the party that has brought the case notifies the Court of its
intention not to proceed with it, the Court shall, after hearing the
opinions of the other parties thereto and the representatives of the
victims or their next of kin, decide whether to discontinue the
hearing and, consequently, to strike the case from its list.' 7
The Rules of the Inter-American Court are limited to regulating the
effects of the discontinuance, if such is applicable, previous consultation
with the petitioner's counsel, the presumed victim or relatives, if proper,
and consequently, whether it follows to supersede the case and file it.
However, even when a discontinuance is granted, article 54 of the Rules
provides that "the existence of the conditions indicated in the preceding
paragraphs notwithstanding, the Court may, bearing in mind its
responsibility to protect human rights, decide to continue the consideration
of a case."" One of these conditions is the discontinuance.
As for the procedural form of acceptance of the claim, the Rules of
the Inter-American Court do not contemplate it and article 31 of the Rules
regulates the application of article 63.1 of the Convention. That article
would also be applied in the event of an acceptance of a claim. This article
states:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or
freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that
the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom
that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the
consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the
breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair
compensation be paid to the injured party. 19
16. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RULES OF PROCEDURE,
OEA/Ser. LIV/11.3. doc. 13, Corr.1 (1981), reprined in 20 ILM 1289 (1980) [hereinafter The
Rules].
17. Id. art. 52.1.
18. Id. art. 54.
19. The Convention, smpra note 7, art. 63.1.
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D. Rules of the European Court of Human Rights'"
Article 48 of the Rules of the European Court of Human Rights is
very similar to article 52.1 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
because the latter was taken from the former. Indeed, in Europe there is
also express regulation concerning the discontinuance, but these regulations
do not mention the acceptance of a claim. It is also stated that the
Chamber of the Court familiar with the case, considering its responsibilities
concerning the court in accordance with article 19 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms,2 can order to continue the examination of a case in the presence
of a discontinuance. article 48, in its pertinent parts states the following:
When the party which has filed the case before the Court notifies
the Secretary of his intention not to proceed and the other parties
accept the discontinuance, the Chamber, after consulting with the
Commission and the applicant, will decide whether or not there is
place for the acceptance of the discontinuance and, consequently,
the closing of the case.22
The Chamber, according to the responsibilities that concern the Court
following to article 19 of the Convention, may order that the examination
of the case continue regardless of the discontinuance, friendly settlement,
transaction, etc.' Article 49 of the Rules of the European Court is also
similar to article 31 of the Rules of the Inter-American Court. It regulates
what is relevant to the application of article 50 of the European
Convention, which is applied in the case of a discontinuance. Article 50
states that:
If the decision of the Court declares that a resolution or a measure
ordered by a judicial authority or any other authority of a
contracting party is totally or partially against the obligations
20. R. Eur. Ct. H.R. (repealed 1998).
Editor's note: The new European Court of Human Rights came into operation on November 1,
1998. However, Protocol No. 11 provides that the European Commission should continue until
October 31, 1999 to deal with cases which had been declared admissible before the date of entry
into force. With the establishment of the new court, the newly elected judges drafted new rules of
procedure for the European Court. See The New European Court of Human Rights, Historical
background, organization and procedure (visited May 31, 1999)
< http://194.250.50.200/eng/PRESS/New%20Court/infodoc%20rvised%202.htmTransitional
period >.
21. Eur. Cony. H.R., art. 19. (September 1953) (visited May 31, 1999)
< http://www.coefr/eng/legaltxt/e-dh.htm#conv-dh >.
22. R. Eur. Ct. H.R., supra note 20, art. 48.
23. Id.
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derived from the present Convention, and if the internal right of
this party only allows in an imperfect manner to repair the
consequences of this resolution or measure, the decision of the
Court will grant, if it proceeds, a just satisfaction to the injured
party.'
It is important to emphasize that article 48 regulates what is
established by article 37 of the European Convention that states in part as
follows:
The Commission may at any stage of the proceedings decide to
strike a petition of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to
the conclusion that:
The applicant does not intend to pursue his petition....
[H]owever, the Commission shall continue the examination of a
petition if respect for human rights as defined in this Convention
so requires. 23
E. Rules of the International Court of Justice26
The Rules of the International Court of Justice regulate matters related
to the discontinuance in a wide and detailed manner. Article 88 states that:
1. If at any time before the final judgment on the merits has
been delivered the parties, either jointly or separately, notify the
Court in writing that they have agreed to discontinue the
proceedings, the Court shall make an order recording the
discontinuance and directing that the case be removed from the
list.
2. If the parties have agreed to discontinue the proceedings in
consequence of having reached a settlement of the dispute and if
they so desire, the Court may record this fact in the order for the
removal of the case from the list, or indicate in, or annex to, the
order, the terms of the settlement.
3. If the Court is not sitting, any order under this article may
be made by the President.
24. Id. art. 50.
25. Eur. Cony. H.R., supra note 21, art. 37.
26. R.I.C.J. (April 14, 1978) (visited May 31, 1999) <http://www.ici-
cii .orlicjwww/ibasicdocuments/Basetextlinlesofcourt.html>.
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Article 89 further states that:
1. If in the course of proceedings instituted by means of an
application, the applicant informs the Court in writing that it is
not going on with the proceedings, and if, at the date on which
this communication is received by the Registry, the respondent
has not yet taken any step in the proceedings, the Court shall
make an order officially recording the discontinuance of the
proceedings and directing the removal of the case from the list. A
copy of this order shall be sent by the Registrar to the respondent.
2. If, at the time when the notice of discontinuance is
received, the respondent has already taken some step in the
proceedings, the Court shall fix a time-limit within which the
respondent may state whether it opposes the discontinuance of the
proceedings. If no objection is made to the discontinuance before
the expiration of the time-limit, acquiescence will be presumed
and the Court shall make an order officially recording the
discontinuance of the proceedings and directing the removal of the
case from the list. If objection is made, the proceedings shall
continue.
3. If the Court is not sitting, its powers under this article may
be exercised by the President.'
It is appropriate to highlight that the Rules of the Inter-American
Court and those of the European Court of Human Rights do not make
reference to acceptance of a claim.
II. CONTENTIOUS JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Discontinuance
Maqueda v. Argentina
The Maqueda Case was filed in the Inter-American Court by the Inter-
American Commission on May 25, 1994.30 The issue was whether there
had been a violation, by the Argentinean Government, of the American
27. Id. art. 88.
28. Id. art. 89.
29. Maqueda v. Argentina, Judgment of January 17, 1995, Inter-Am. CQ. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 18 (1995).
30. Id. para. 1.
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Convention by virtue of the sentencing of Guillermo Jos6 Maqueda, an
Argentine citizen, to ten years of imprisonment, in violation of the
Convention. 3' Among the rights that the Commission alleged that
Argentina had violated in detriment of the alleged victim, were the right to
be heard by an impartial court;32 the right to the presumption of
innocence; 33 and the right to appeal a decision before a judge or superior
tribunal.' The Commission also requested that the Court find that the
Argentinean State ordered Guillermo Maqueda's immediate release by
means of pardon or commutation of the sentence, the payment of an
appropriate compensation, and of the costs of the proceedings.35
According to the petition, Guillermo Maqueda was an active member
of Movimiento Todos por la Patria (All for the Fatherland Movement), a
political movement of a democratic nature that is legally recognized.36 Mr.
Maqueda attended a movement meeting held on January 22, 1989. 37 At the
meeting, motivated by the possibility of a military uprising in the La
Tablada Quarters, he decided to participate in a demonstration against the
uprising that was to take place the following day.38 Upon his arrival to the
vicinity of La Tablada Quarters, the group was faced with an armed
confrontation among a group of people that attempted to take over the base
and the military.39 These circumstances prevented the group from carrying
out the peaceful mobilization programmed and Maqueda left the place a
few hours later." Several members of the Movimiento Todos Por La
Patria participated in the attack and were detained and condemned for the
commission of several offenses. 4 '
Several months later, on May 19, 1989, Mr. Maqueda was arrested. 42
On June 11, 1990, the San Martin Federal Chamber sentenced him to ten
years of prison as an accomplice in the crime of qualified unlawful
assembly, and an accessory in the offenses of rebellion, illegal seizure,
aggravated robbery, aggravated unlawful imprisonment, consummated and
attempted doubly aggravated homicides, and serious and minor damages.43
31. Id. para. 2.
32. The Convention, supra note 7, art. 8.1.
33. Id. art. 8.2.
34. Id. art. 8.2.h.
35. Maqueda. (Ser. C) No.18, para. 2.
36. Id. para. 3.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. par. 4.
40. Maqueda, (Ser. C) No.18, pam. 4.
41. Id. para. 5.
42. Id. para. 6.
43. Id.
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His legal representatives lodged a special appeal that was rejected by the
San Martin Federal Chamber of Appeals on October 25, 1990." In view
of such denial, they lodged a complaint appeal for rejection of the special
appeal with the Supreme Court of the Nation which was also rejected on
March 17, 1992, thereby exhausting all existing procedural possibilities
provided for in the internal jurisdiction.45 According to the Commission,
Guillermo Maqueda did not have the possibility to lodge a remedy for
review of the judgment, since Law 23.077 does not provide for the
possibility of any appeal or broad remedy before any Court of Appeals
(only Appeal After Execution of the Judgment, an exceptional resource and
subject to restrictions), for which he also requested the Court that it
declared that Argentina should establish an ordinary mechanism that
guaranteed the double instance in the procedure established by the stated
Law 23.077.' The Argentinean Government was notified of the complaint
on June 24, 1994.' 7
On October 4, 1994, less than four months after filing the complaint,
the Commission notified the Court of its decision to discontinue the action
in the Maqueda Case because an agreement had been executed which
"welcomes the interests of the parties and . .. is in conformity with the
spirit and letter of the Convention."" In accordance with this agreement
signed on September 20, 1994, the Argentinean State committed to dictate
an ordinance of commutation of sentence which allowed Mr. Maqueda to
be paroled immediately.49 Subsequently, in December of 1994, Cejil and
Human Rights Watch/Americas in representation of Guillermo Maqueda's
parents informed the Court that they consented to the discontinuance
formulated by the Commission, and on December 12, 1994, the
Government expressed its favorable opinion concerning the request by the
Commission.' °
Consequently, taking into account the above mentioned and
considering that the principal matter of the case was the violation of Mr.
Maqueda's right to freedom, and that this right had been restored by the
agreement between the parties, the Court decided that the agreement did
not violate the letter and spirit of the American Convention. Although the
Commission submitted other rights protected under the Convention in its
complaint citing mechanisms and provisions of internal law, these rights
were pleaded in relation to the right to freedom. Notwithstanding such
conditions, the Court, mindful of its responsibility to protect human rights,
44. Id.
45. Maqueda, (Ser. C) No.18, para. 6.
46. Id.
47. Id. para. 12.
48. Id. para. 16.
49. Id. para. 18.
50. Maqueda. (Ser. C) No.18, para. 21, 22.
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reserved the power to reopen and proceed with consideration of the case,
should at any future time a change occur in the circumstances that gave rise
to the agreement."
Therefore the Court, by means of its January 17, 1995 resolution,
admitted the discontinuance of the action presented by the Commission in
the Maqueda Case, and dismissed it.52 However, the Court reserved the
authority to reopen it and to continue the procedure of the case if there
would be in the future a change of circumstances that may give rise to the
agreement.53
B. Acceptance of a Claim
Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname'
This case was filed in the Inter-American Court by the Inter-American
Commission on August 27, 1990. 5  The issue was whether the
Government of Suriname violated the American Convention to the
detriment of Daison Aloeboetoe, Dedemanu Aloeboetoe, Mikuwendje
Aloeboetoe, John Amoida, Richenel Voola, Martin Indisie Banai and Beri
Tiopo, all citizens of Surinam. Among the rights that the Commission
alleged were violated by Suriname were the right to life; the right to
humane treatment; the right to personal freedom; and the judicial
protection.-6 The Commission also requested that the relatives of the
victims be awarded a fair compensation."
In accordance with the guidelines of the Rules of the Court, the
Commission presented its memorandum of law on April 1, 1991, and the
Court received the memorandum in response from Suriname on June 28,
1991." The Government of Surinam presented preliminary exceptions
along with its memorandum.5 9 A public hearing was held on December 2,
1991, with the purpose of hearing the arguments of the parties regarding
preliminary exceptions.WO Although the hearing was scheduled to deal with
51. Id. para. 27.
52 Id.
53. Id.
54. Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Judgment of December 4, 1991, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 11 (1994).
55. Id. para. 1.
56. Id. para. 2.
57. Id.
58. Id. para. 8.
59. Aloeboetoe, (Ser. C) No. 11, para. 8.
60. Id. para. 9.
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preliminary exceptions, at the meeting, the Government also recognized its
responsibility for the events giving rise to this case.61
According to the facts denounced before the Commission, the events
occurred on January 15, 1988, in Atjoni (landing stage of the village of
Pokigron, District of Sipaliwini) and in Tjongalangapassi, off kilometer 30
in the District of Brokopondo.' In the first of those places, Atjoni, more
than twenty unarmed, male maroons were beaten with rifle-butts by
soldiers who had detained them under the suspicion that they were
members of the Jungle Commando.' They were forced to lie facedown on
the ground while the soldiers stepped on their backs, tortured them, and
urinated on them.' The Captain of the village of Gujaba made a point of
telling Commander Leeflang of the Army that the persons in question were
civilians from several different villages.' Commander Leeflang ignored
this information.'
Following the Atjoni incident, the soldiers allowed some of the
maroons to continue their trip. However, the seven people previously
mentioned were blindfolded and dragged into a milital, vehicle and driven
towards Paramaribo along the Tjongalangapassi road. Upon reaching the
kilometer 30, the vehicle stopped, and the victims were taken out and
ordered to dig.6 Richenel Voola tried to escape .70 They shot at him and
he fell to the ground, wounded, but they did not go after him.' Soon after,
shooting and screaming were heard.' The other six maroons were killed r3
On Monday, January 4, 1988, men from Gujaba and Grantatai arrived
at kilometer 30 at 7 p.m. 74 They found Aside, who was seriously wounded
and in critical condition, as well as the bodies of the other victims.75 Aside
indicated that he was the only survivor.76 The bodies of the other victims
61. Id. para. 10.
62. Id. pam. 11.
63. Id.
64. Aloeboetoe, (Ser. C) No. 11, para. 11.
65. Id. para. 12.
66. Id.
67. Id. para. 13.
68. Id.
69. Aloeboetoe, (Ser. C) No. 11, para. 14.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Aloeboetoe, (Ser. C) No. 11, pam. 14.
74. Aloeboetoe, (Ser. C) No. 11, para. 15.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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had been partially devoured by vultures.' Aside was admitted in the
Academic Hospital of Paramaribo on January 6, 1988, but died soon
after.7" The accusation before the Inter-American Commission was signed
by Stanley Rensch who talked to Aside twice about what happened and
who corroborated the information stated by more than fifteen persons."
At the hearing, convened on December 2, 1991, for the purpose of
dealing with the preliminary objections, the Agent for Suriname declared
that "[t]he Republic of Suriname, having reference to the first case being
considered in the proceedings now before the Court, accepts responsibility
for the consequences of the Pokigron case, better known as Aloeboetoe et
al"' He later added: "I simply wish to reiterate [that Suriname] accepts its
responsibility in the instant case."'" Following a request for clarification by
the Commission's Delegate, Mr. Jackman, the Agent for Suriname
subsequently explained: "I believe my statement was clear: it accepts
responsibility. Consequently, the Court has the right to close the case, file
it, determine the compensation payable or do whatever is appropriate under
the law." 8
2
Consequently, a judgment dated December 4, 1991, noted the
admission of responsibility made by the Republic of Suriname and decided
that the controversy had ceased regarding the facts that gave rise to this
case. 3 Later, by judgment dated September 10, 1993, the Court ordered
the pertinent actions on the reparation in this case."
El Amparo v. Venezuela'
The Inter-American Commission filed this case in the Court on
January 14, 1994. 6 The issue to be decided was whether the government
of Venezuela had violated the American Convention in detriment of Jos6 R.
Araujo, Luis A. Berrios, Mois6s A. Blanco, Julio P. Ceballos, Antonio
Eregua, Rafael M. Moreno, Jos6 Indalecio Guerrero, Arin 0. Maldonado,
Justo Mercado, Pedro Mosquera, Jos6 Puerta, Marino Torrealba, Josd
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Aloeboetoe, (Ser. C) No. 11, para. 16.
80. Id.
81. Id. para. 22.
82. Id.
83. Id. decision, para. 1.
84. Aloeboetoe v. Suriname (Reparations), Judgment of September 10, 1993, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15 (1994).
85. El Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of January 18, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 19 (1995).
86. Id. para. 1.
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Torrealba and Marino Rivas, all Venezuelan citizens. 7 The Commission
alleged that Venezuela had violated the right to life; the right to humane
treatment; the judicial guarantees; the equality before the law; and the
judicial protection. 8 The Commission also requested that Venezuela
compensate and reimburse the direct relatives of the victims.8 9 Venezuela
answered the demand on August 1, 1994. 90
According to the petition, on October 29, 1988 in the "La Colorada"
canal, Distrito Piez, State of Apures, Venezuela, sixteen fishermen
residents of the town "El Amparo" were traveling in the direction of the
'La Colorada' Canal on the Arauca River to participate in a fishing trip, at
approximately 11:20 a.m.9' When some fishermen were leaving the boat,
members of the military and the police of the "Comando Especifico" Jos6
Antonio Pfez" that were conducting a military operation denominated
"Anguila III," killed fourteen of the sixteen men.' Two of the fishermen,
Wollmer Gregorio Pinilla and Jos6 Augusto Arias, escaped by jumping into
the water and swimming across the "La Colorada" Canal. 93 The survivors
were protected by the Commander of the Police of El Amparo, Adfin de
Jesfis Tovar Araque, in spite of the fact that he was subjected to pressure
by police and military functionaries of San Crist6bal, State of Tfchira. 9
According to the petition, the Chief Inspector of the Intelligence and
Prevention Services Directorate, Celso Jos6 Rinc6n Fuentes, visited the
Chief of Police of El Amparo in the afternoon of October 29, 1988, and
said that they had killed fourteen guerrilla members and two had escaped. 95
By note of January 11, 1995, the government informed the President
that Venezuela "[d]oes not contest the facts referred to in the complaint and
accepts the international responsibility of the State,"' and requested the
Court to ask the Commission "[t]o come together to a non-litigious
procedure with the object of determining in friendly fashion, under
supervision by the Court, the reparations applicable, the preceding in
conformity with the provisions of articles 43 and 48 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Court."' The Inter-American Commission was informed
87. Id. par. 2.
88. Id.
89. Id. para. 4.
90. El Amparo, (Ser. C) No. 19, para. 9.
91. Id. para. 10.
92. Id.
93. Id. para. 11.
94. Id.
95. ElAmparo, (Ser. C) No. 19, para. 12.
96. Id. para. 19.
97. Id.
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about this note by the Secretariat, and acknowledged receipt of the same on
January 13, 1995.9"
Consequently, by judgment dated January 18, 1995, the Court, took
note of the recognition of responsibility made by the Republic of
Venezuela." The Court decided that the controversy concerning the facts
that originated the case had ceased, and it decided that Venezuela was
liable for the payment of damages and to pay a fair indemnification to the
surviving victims and the next-of-kin of the deceased. "(o
Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina"°"
This case was filed in the Court by the Inter-American Commission on
May 29, 1995. " The issue was whether the Government of Argentina
violated the American Convention in the disappearance of Ratil Baigorria
and Adolfo Garrido, Argentinean citizens."° The Commission alleged that
Argentina had violated the alleged victims' right to life; °4 the right to
humane treatment; 1 5  the judicial guarantees; °6  and the" judicial
protection.1 7  The Commission also requested that Argentina fully
indemnify the families of the victims for the grave material and moral
injury caused." °8  On September 11, 1995, Argentina answered the
petition. "
According to the demand, based upon the testimony of eyewitnesses,
on April 28, 1990, at approximately 4:00p.m., Adolfo Argentino Garrido-
Calder6n and Rafil Baigorria-Balmaceda were detained while driving
around." ° They were detained by uniformed personnel of the Police of
Mendoza in the General San Martin Park."' The vehicle in which the
detainees traveled was found by their relatives in the Fifth Police Station of
Mendoza.1 2  The Police stated that the vehicle had been found in the
98. Id.
99. Id. decision, para. 1.
100. Id. para. 1, 2.
101. Garrido v. Argentina, Judgment of February 2, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 26 (1996).
102. Id. para. 1.
103. Id. para. 2.
104. See The Convention, supra note 7, art. 4.
105. Id. art. 5.
106. Id. art. 8.1.
107. Id. art. 25.
108. Garrido, (Ser. C) No. 26, para. 2.
109. Id. para. 7.
110. Id. para.10.
111. Id.
112. Id. para.12.
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General San Martin Park as a result of an anonymous call claiming that
there was an abandoned car in that location."'
Mr. Garrido's relatives asked that Attorney Mabel Osorio find his
whereabouts since there was a judicial order for his detention.1 4 However,
Mr. Garrido was not detained at any police division. 1 On April 30, 1990,
a writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf of Mr. Garrido without any
results and the same thing happened to another habeas corpus filed on May
3, 1990, on behalf of Mr. Baigorria." 6 On September 19, 1991, a new
writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf of both missing persons, but it
was rejected. 117 The resolution was appealed before the Third Criminal
Chamber of Mendoza, which denied the appeal on November 25, 1991. "
On May 2, 1990, the Garrido family filed a formal complaint for the
disappearance of both men, which was processed in the Fourth Court of
Investigation of the First Judicial District. " Several years later the court
documents in this case were still in the initial stage of the proceedings.' 2
The family also denounced the facts before the governmental authorities of
the County of Mendoza.'
2
'
During the first five years following the disappearance of Mr. Garrido
and Mr. Baigorria, their relatives denounced the events at the local,
national, and international level." They made diverse claims before the
governmental authorities and they carried out an intense search in judicial,
police, and health facilities, all to no avail.'"
The Court considered it pertinent to transcribe the following two
paragraphs of Argentina's answer to the complaint:
The Government of Argentina accepts the facts set forth in Item II
of the application in relation to the situation of Mr. Rafi Baigorria
and Mr. Adolfo Garrido, facts which substantially coincide with
those raised in the presentation before the Illustrious Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights that were not questioned
at that time.' 21
113. Garrido, (Ser. C) No. 26, para. 12.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. para. 13.
117. Id. par. 17.
118. Garrido, (Ser. C) No. 26, para. 17.
119. Id. para. 14.
120. Id. para. 19.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Garrido, (Ser. C) No. 26, para. 19.
124. Id. para. 24.
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The Government of the Republic of Argentina accepts the legal
consequences to the Government resulting from the facts referred
to in the previous paragraph in light of article 28(1) and (2) of the
American Convention on Human Rights inasmuch as the
competent court has not been able to identify the person or
persons criminally responsible for the crimes against Rafil
Baigorria and in that way clarify their whereabouts."
During the hearing held on February 1, 1996, the Alternate Agent
from Argentina, Ambassador Humberto Toledo expressed that his
government "Ilotally accept[ed] its international responsibility" and
reiterated "the acceptance of international responsibility of the Argentine
State in a case of this kind.""2
At the same hearing, the Commission expressed its agreement to the
terms of the acceptance of responsibility made by the Alternate Agent of
Argentina.'27
Consequently, by means of judgment entered on February 2, 1996,
not having outlined the discontinuance of the right, but instead of the
action, it took note of the acceptance made by Argentina of the acts stated
in the application and the acceptance of international responsibility for
those acts. 128 Additionally, it granted the parties a period of six months to
reach an agreement on reparations and compensation.'29 Failure to reach
an agreement would allow the Court to continue the proceedings regarding
reparations and compensations. 30
III. CONCLUSION
The following conclusions may be reached from the analysis of the use of
the procedural forms of discontinuance and acceptance of a claim in the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court:
1. The discontinuance is a procedural form of extreme
importance because it is a medium to which the Commission can
appeal, after it has presented a case to the Court and arrived to an
agreement with the demanded State to terminate the process. It
reflects a serious and responsible attitude by the parties in a case,
125. M.
126. Id. para. 25.
127. Id.
128. Garrido, (Ser. C) No. 26, decision, para. 1.
129. Id. para. 2.
130. Id. pan. 4.
Robles
to utilize the principle of procedural economy and thus, avoid
unnecessary expenses to the Inter-American System.
2. The acceptance of a claim also has an enormous importance
because it represents a serious and responsible attitude by the
States demanded before the Court, since they opt to assume its
responsibilities rather than contend the facts of the demand and
they do not subject the Court and the system to a long and
difficult process.
3. The procedural form of acceptance of a claim is properly
regulated in the Rules of the Court.
4. In the case of the acceptance of a claim, this procedural form
is not in the Rules of the Court therefore, given its importance, it
would be convenient to regulate it as well as its procedural
effects. Mainly, the Court should expressly point out the rights
that the demanded States would be responsible of violating as a
consequence of the acceptance of a claim.
5. The precedents invoked in this comment can end up being
relevant in the measure in which in the future, other States decide
to follow them thereby strengthening the Inter-American system
for the protection of human rights.
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